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Abstract
In this paper, we propose a novel class of Nash problems for Cognitive Radio (CR) networks, modeled as
Gaussian frequency-selective interference channels, wherein each secondary user (SU) competes against
the others to maximize his own opportunistic throughput by choosing jointly the sensing duration,
the detection thresholds, and the vector power allocation. The proposed general formulation allows
to accommodate several (transmit) power and (deterministic/probabilistic) interference constraints,
such as constraints on the maximum individual and/or aggregate (probabilistic) interference tolerable
at the primary receivers. To keep the optimization as decentralized as possible, global (coupling)
interference constraints are imposed by penalizing each SU with a set of time-varying prices based
upon his contribution to the total interference; the prices are thus additional variable to optimize. The
resulting players’ optimization problems are nonconvex ; moreover, there are possibly price clearing
conditions associated with the global constraints to be satisfied by the solution. All this makes the
analysis of the proposed games a challenging task; none of classical results in the game theory literature
can be successfully applied.
The main contribution of this paper is to develop a novel optimization-based theory for studying the
proposed nonconvex games; we provide a comprehensive analysis of the existence and uniqueness of
a standard Nash equilibrium, devise alternative best-response based algorithms, and establish their
convergence. Some of the proposed algorithms are totally distributed and asynchronous, whereas some
others require limited signaling among the SUs (in the form of consensus algorithms) in favor of better
performance; overall, they are thus applicable to a variety of CR scenarios, either cooperative or non-
cooperative, which allows the SUs to explore the existing trade-off between signaling and performance.
1 Introduction
Over the past decade, there has been a growing interest in Cognitive Radio (CR) as an emerging paradigm
to address the de jure shortage of allocated spectrum that contrasts with the de facto abundance of unused
spectrum in virtually any spatial location at almost any given time. The paradigm posits that so-called
∗The work of Pang is based on research supported by the U.S.A. National Science Foundation grant CMMI 0969600 and
by the Air Force Office of Sponsored Research award No. FA9550-09-10329. The work of Scutari was supported by U.S.A.
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cognitive radios [also termed as secondary users (SUs)] would use licensed spectrum in an ad-hoc fashion
in such a way as to cause no harmful interference to the primary spectrum license holders [also termed as
primary users (PUs)]. Evidently, such an opportunistic spectrum access is intertwined with the design of
multiple secondary system components, such as (but not limited to) spectrum sensing and transmission
parameters adaptation. Indeed, the choice of the sensing parameters (e.g., the detection thresholds and
the sensing duration) as well as the consequent design of the physical layer transmission strategies (e.g.,
the transmission rate, the power allocation) have both a direct impact on the performance of primary and
secondary systems. The interplay between these two interacting components calls for a joint optimization
of the sensing and transmission parameters of the SUs, which is the main focus of this paper.
1.1 Motivation and related work
The joint optimization of the sensing and transmission strategies has been only partially addressed in
the literature, even for simple CR scenarios composed of one PU and one SU. For example, in [1, 2],
the authors proposed alternative centralized schemes that optimize the detection thresholds for a bank of
energy detectors, in order to maximize the opportunistic throughput of a SU, for a given sensing time and
constant-rate/power transmissions. The optimization of the sensing time and the sensing time/detection
thresholds for a given missed detection probability and constant rate of one SU was addressed in [3, 4]
and [5], respectively. A throughput-sensing trade-off for a fixed transmission rate was studied in [6]. In [7]
(or [8]) the authors focused on the joint optimization of the power allocation and the equi-false alarm rate
(or the sensing time) of a SU over multi-channel links, for a fixed sensing time (or detection probability).
All the aforementioned schemes however are not applicable to scenarios composed of multiple SUs (and
PUs). The case of multiple SUs and one PU was considered in [9] (and more recently in [10]), under the
same assumptions of [7]; however no formal analysis of the proposed formulation was provided.
The transceiver design of OFDM-based CR systems composed of multiple primary and secondary
users have been largely studied in the literature of power control problems over the interference channel,
and have been traditionally approached from two very different perspectives: a holistic design of the
system and an individual selfish design of each of the users. The former is also referred to as Network
Utility Maximization (NUM) (other approaches within this perspective are based on Nash bargaining
formulations) and has the potential of obtaining the best of the network at the expense of a centralized
computation or heavy signaling/cooperation among the users; examples are [11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17]. The
latter fits perfectly within the mathematical framework of Game Theory and usually leads to distributed
algorithms at the expense of a loss of global performance; related papers are [18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23], and
two recent overviews are [24, 25]. In both the aforementioned approaches and classes of papers the sensing
process is not considered as part of the optimization ; in fact the SUs do not perform any sensing but
they are allowed to transmit over the licensed spectrum provided that they satisfy interference constraints
imposed by the PUs, no matter if the PUs are active of not.
When the sensing comes explicitly into the system design, the application of the holistic approach
mentioned above leads to nonconvex NP hard optimization problems. These cases cannot be globally solved
by efficient algorithms in polynomial time; one typically can design (centralized) sub-optimal algorithms
that converge just to a stationary solution. Their implementation however would require heavy signaling
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among the users (or the presence of a centralized network controller having the knowledge of all the
system parameters); which strongly limits the range of applicability of such formulations to practical CR
networks. For these reasons, in this paper, we attack the multi-agent decision making problem from a
different perspective; we concentrate on optimization strategies where the SUs are able to self-enforce the
negotiated agreements on the usage of the licensed spectrum either in a totally decentralized way or by
requiring limited and local signaling among the SUs (in the form of consensus algorithms). Aiming at
exploring the trade-off between signaling and performance, the proposed approach is then expected to be
more flexible than classical optimization techniques and applicable to a wider range of CR scenarios.
1.2 Main contributions
This paper along with our companion work [26] advances the current approaches (based on the optimization
of specific components of a CR system in isolation), in the direction of a joint and distributed design of
sensing and transmission parameters of a CR network, composed of multiple PUs and SUs.
We study a novel class of Nash equilibrium problems as proposed in [26], wherein each SU aims at
maximizing his own opportunistic throughput by jointly optimizing the sensing parameters−the sensing
time and the false alarm rate (and thus the decision thresholds) of a bank of energy detectors−and the
power allocation over the multi-channel links. Because of sensing errors, the SUs might access the licensed
spectrum when it is still occupied by active PUs, thus causing harmful interference. This motivates the
introduction of probabilistic interference constraints that are imposed to control the power radiated over
the licensed spectrum whenever a missed detection event occurs (in a probabilistic sense). The proposed
formulation accommodates alternative combinations of power/interference constraints. For instance, on
top of classical (deterministic) transmit power (and possibly spectral masks) constraints, we envisage the
use of average individual (i.e., on each SU) and/or global (i.e., over all the SUs) interference tolerable at
the primary receivers. The former class of constraints is more suitable for scenarios where the SUs are
not willing to cooperate; whereas the latter constraints, which are less conservative, seem more realistic
in settings where SUs may want to trade some limited signaling for better performance. By imposing a
coupling among the transmit and sensing strategies of the SUs, global interference constraints introduce
a new challenge in the system design: how to enforce global interference constraints without requiring
a centralized optimization but possibly only limited signaling among the SUs? We address this issue by
introducing a pricing mechanism in the game, through a penalization in the players’ objective functions.
The prices need to be chosen so that the interference constraints are satisfied at any solution of the game
and a clearing condition holds; they are thus additional variables to be determined.
The resulting class of games is nonconvex (because of the nonconvexity of the players’ payoff functions
and constraints), lacks boundedness in the price variables, and there are side constraints with associated
price equilibration that are required to be satisfied by the equilibrium; all these features make the analysis
a challenging task. The convexity of the players’ individual optimization problems is, in fact, one indis-
pensable assumption under which noncooperative games have traditionally been studied and analyzed.
The classical case where a NE exists is indeed when the players’ objective functions are (quasi-)convex in
their own variables with the other players’ strategies fixed, and the players’ constraint sets are compact
and convex and independent of their rivals’ strategies (see, e.g., [27, 28]). Without such convexity, a NE
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may not exist (as in the well-known case of a matrix game with pure strategies); analytically, abstract
mathematical theories granting its existence, like those in [29, 30], are difficult to be applied to games
arising from realistic applications such as those occurred in the present paper.
The main contribution of this work is to develop a novel optimization-based theory for the solution
analysis of the proposed class of nonconvex games (possibly) with side constraints and price clearing con-
ditions, and to design distributed best-response based algorithms for computing the Nash equilibria, along
with their convergence properties. Building on [31], the solution analysis is addressed by introducing a
“best-response” map (including price variables) defined on a proper convex and compact set, whose fixed-
points, if they exist, are Nash equilibria of the original nonconvex games; the obtained conditions are in
fact sufficient for such a map to be a single-valued continuous map; this enables the application of the
Brouwer fixed-point theorem to deduce the existence of a fixed-point of the best-response map, thus of a
NE of the whole class of proposed games. While seemingly very simple, the technical details lie in deriving
(reasonable) conditions for which the best-response map is single-valued and for the boundedness of the
prices in order for the existence of a compact set on which the Brouwer result can be based. Interestingly,
the obtained conditions have the same physical interpretation of those obtained for the convergence of
the renowned iterative waterfilling algorithm solving the power control game over interference channels
[18, 19, 20, 21, 22]. We then focus on solutions schemes for the proposed class of games; we design alterna-
tive distributed (possibly) asynchronous best-response based algorithms that differ in performance, level
of protection of the PUs, computational effort and degree of cooperation/signaling among the SUs, and
convergence speed; which makes them applicable to a variety of CR scenarios (either cooperative or nonco-
operative). For each algorithm, we establish its convergence and also quantify the time and communication
costs for its implementation. Our numerical results show that: i) the proposed joint sensing/transmission
optimization outperforms current centralized and decentralized state-of-the-art results based on separated
optimization of the sensing and the transmission parts; ii) our algorithms exhibit a fast convergence behav-
ior; and iii) as expected, some (limited) cooperation among the SUs (in the form of consensus algorithms)
yields a significant improvement in the system performance. The proposed solution schemes can also be
used to compute the so-called Quasi-NE of the associated games, a relaxed equilibrium concept introduced
and studied in our companion paper [26].
The paper is organized as follows. Sec. 2 briefly introduces the system model, as proposed in [26];
Sec. 3 focuses on the system design and formulates the joint optimization of the sensing parameters and
the power allocation of the SUs within the framework of game theory; several games are introduced. The
solution analysis of the proposed games is addressed in Sec. 4, where sufficient conditions for the existence
and uniqueness of a standard NE along with their interpretation are derived. Distributed algorithms
solving the proposed games along with their convergence properties and computational/communication
complexity are studied in Sec. 5. Numerical experiments are reported in Sec. 6, whereas Sec. 7 draws
the conclusions. Proofs of our results are given in Appendix A-F. The paper requires a background
on Variational Inequalities (VIs); we refer to [32, 33] for an introductory overview of the subject and its
application to equilibrium problems in signal processing and communications. A comprehensive treatment
of VIs can be found in the two monographs [34, 35]; a detailed study of convex games based on the VI
and complementarity approach is addressed in [36, 22]. The main properties of Z and P matrices, which
are widely used in the paper, can be found in [34, 37].
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2 System Model
We consider a scenario composed of Q active SUs, each consisting of a transmitter-receiver pair, coexisting
in the same area and sharing the same band with PUs. The network of the SUs is modeled as an N -
frequency-selective SISO Interference Channel (IC), where N is the number of subcarriers available to
the cognitive users. We focus on multicarrier block-transmissions without loss of generality. In order not
to interfere with on-going PU transmissions, before transmitting, the SUs sense periodically the licensed
spectrum looking for the subcarriers that are temporarily not occupied by the PUs. A brief description of
the sensing mechanism and transmission phase performed by the SUs as proposed in the companion paper
[26] is given in the following, where we introduce the basic definitions and notation used throughout the
paper; we refer the reader to [26] for details and the assumptions underlying the proposed model.
2.1 The spectrum sensing phase
In [26], we formulated the sensing problem as a binary hypothesis testing; the decision rule of SU q over
carrier k = 1, . . . , N based on the energy detector is
Dq,k ,
1
Kq
Kq∑
n=1
|yq,k[n]|2
H1,k
><
H0,k
γq,k (1)
where yq,k[n] is the received baseband complex signal over carrier k; Kq = ⌊τq fq⌋ ⋍ τq fq is the number
of samples, with τq and fq denoting the sensing time and the sampling frequency, respectively; γq,k is the
decision threshold for the carrier k; H0,k represents the absence of any primary signal over the subcarrier
k, whereas H1,k represents the presence of the primary signaling.
The performance of the energy detection performed by SU q over carrier k is measured in terms of the
detection probability P dq,k(γq,k, τq) , Prob {Dq,k > γq,k |H1,k} and false alarm probability P faq,k(γq,k, τq) ,
Prob{Dq,k > γq,k |H0,k}. Under standard assumptions in decision theory, these probabilities are given by
[26]
P faq,k (γq,k, τq) = Q
(√
τq fq
γq,k − µq,k|0
σq,k|0
)
and P dq,k (γq,k, τq) = Q
(√
τq fq
γq,k − µq,k|1
σq,k|1
)
, (2)
where Q(x) , (1/√2π) ´∞x e−t
2/2dt is the Q-function, and µq,k|0, µq,k|1, σq,k|0, and σq,k|1 are constant
parameters, whose explicit expressions are given in [26]. The detection probability P dq,k can also be
rewritten as a function of the false alarm rate P faq,k as:
P dq,k
(
P faq,k, τq
)
= Q
(
σq,k|0
σq,k|1
Q−1 (P faq,k)−√τq fq µq,k|1 − µq,k|0σq,k|1
)
, 1− Pmissq,k
(
τq, P
fa
q,k
)
, (3)
where we also introduced the definition of the missed detection probability Pmissq,k (τq, P
fa
q,k) , 1−P dq,k(τq, P faq,k).
The interpretation of P faq,k (γq,k, τq) and P
d
q,k (γq,k, τq) within the CR scenario is the following: 1−P faq,k
signifies the probability of successfully identifying from the SU q a spectral hole over carrier k, whereas the
missed detection probability P missq,k represents the probability of SU q failing to detect the presence of the
PUs on the subchannel k and thus generating interference against the PUs. The free variables to optimize
are the detection thresholds γq,k’s and the sensing times τq’s; ideally, we would like to choose γq,k’s and
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τq’s in order to minimize both P
fa
q,k and P
(q,k)
miss , but (3) shows that there exists a trade-off between these
two quantities that will affect both primary and secondary performance. It turns out that, γq,k’s and τq’s
can not be chosen by focusing only on the detection problem (as in classical decision theory), but the
optimal choice of γq,k and τq must be the result of a joint optimization of the sensing and transmission
strategies over the two phases; such an optimization is introduced in Sec. 3.
Robust sensing model. The proposed sensing model can be generalized in several directions; see
[38, 26]. For instance, one can explicitly take into account device-level uncertainties (e.g., uncertainty in
the power spectral density of the PUs’ signals and thermal noise) as well as system level uncertainties
(e.g., the current number of active PUs) by modeling the detection process of the primary signals as a
composite hypothesis testing. This leads to a uniformly most-powerful detector scheme that is robust
against device-level and system-level uncertainties; detailed can be found in [38, 26] and are omitted here.
It is important however to remark that the resulting detection probability and false alarm rate of the
aforementioned robust scheme are still given by (2) and (3), but with a different expression for µq,k|i’s
and σ2q,k|i’s [38]. This means that analysis and results developed in the next sections are valid also for this
more general model.
2.2 The transmission phase
The transmission strategy of each SU q is the power allocation vector pq = {pq,k}Nk=1 over the N subcar-
riers, subject to the following (local) transmit power constraints
Pq ,
{
pq , (pq,k)
N
k=1 ∈ RN :
N∑
k=1
pq,k ≤ Pq, 0 ≤ pq ≤ pmaxq
}
, (4)
where pmaxq = (p
max
q,k )
N
k=1 denotes possibly spectral mask [the vector inequality in (4) is component-wise].
According to the opportunistic transmission paradigm, each subcarrier k is available for the transmis-
sion of SU q if no primary signal is detected over that frequency band, which happens with probability
1 − P faq,k. This motivates the use of the aggregate opportunistic throughput as a measure of the spectrum
efficiency of each SU q. Given the power allocation profile p = (pq)
Q
q=1 of the SUs, the target false alarm
rate P faq (assumed to be equal over the whole licensed spectrum), the sensing time τq, and taking the log
of the opportunistic throughput, the payoff function of each SU q is then (see [26] for more details)
Rq
(
τq, p, P
fa
q
)
= log
((
1− τq
Tq
) (
1− P faq
) N∑
k=1
rq,k (p)
)
(5)
where 1 − τq/Tq, with τq ≤ Tq, is the portion of the frame duration Tq available for opportunistic trans-
missions and rq,k(p) is the maximum information rate achievable on link q over carrier k when no primary
signal is detected and the power allocation profile of the SUs is p1,k, . . . , pQ,k:
rq,k(p) = log
(
1 +
pq,k
σˆ2q,k +
∑
r 6=q |Hˆqr(k)|2pr,k
)
, (6)
with Hˆqr(k) , Hqr(k)/Hqq(k) and σˆ
2
q,k , σ
2
q,k/|Hqq(k)|2, where {Hqq(k)}Nk=1 is the channel transfer
function of the direct link q and {Hqr(k)}Nk=1 is the cross-channel transfer function between the secondary
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transmitter r and the secondary receiver q; and σ2q,k is the power spectral density (PSD) of the background
noise over carrier k at the receiver q (assumed to be Gaussian zero-mean distributed).
As a final remark note that the throughput defined in (5) is not the average throughput experienced by
the SUs, which instead would include an additional rate contribution resulting from the erroneous decision
of the SUs to transmit over the licensed spectrum still occupied by the PUs. We have not included this
contribution in the objective functions of the SUs because in maximizing the function we do not want
to “incentivize” the undue usage of the licensed spectrum. Moreover, differently from the opportunistic
throughput in (5), the maximization of the average throughput would require the knowledge from the SUs
of the a-priori probabilities of the PUs’ spectrum occupancy, which is in general not available.
2.3 Probabilistic interference constraints
Due to the inherent trade-off between P faq and P
miss
q,k (P
(q)
fa ) [see (2) and (3)], maximizing the aggregate
opportunistic throughput (5) of SUs will result in low P faq and thus large P
miss
q,k , hence causing harmful
interference to PUs. To allow the SUs’ transmissions while preserving the QoS of the PUs, we envisage
the use of probabilistic interference constraints that limit the interference generated by the SUs whenever
they misdetect the presence of a PU. Examples of these constraints are the following:
- Individual overall bandwidth interference constraint : for each SU q,
N∑
k=1
Pmissq,k
(
τq, P
fa
q
) · wq,k · pq,k ≤ Imaxq , (7)
- Global overall bandwidth interference constraints:
Q∑
q=1
∑
k∈Kp
Pmissq,k
(
τq, P
fa
q
) · wq,k · pq,k ≤ Imax, (8)
where Imaxq [or I
max] are the maximum average interference allowed to be generated by the SU q [or all the
SU’s] that is tolerable at the primary receiver; and wq,k’s are a given set of positive weights. If an estimate
of the cross-channel transfer functions {GP,q(k)}Nk=1 between the secondary transmitters and the primary
receiver is available, then the natural choice for wq,k is wq,k = |GP,q(k)|2, so that (7) and (8) become
the average interference experienced at the primary receiver. Methods to obtain the interference limits
along with some implementation aspects related to this issue and alternative interference constraints are
discussed in Sec. 5.1.1.
We wish to point out that other interference constraints, like per-carrier interference constraints, as
well as multiple PUs can be readily accommodated, without affecting the analysis and results that will be
presented in the forthcoming sections. For notational simplicity, we stay within the above setting.
3 System Design based on Game Theory
We focus now on the system design and formulate the joint optimization of the sensing parameters and
the power allocation of the SUs within the framework of game theory. We consider next two classes of
equilibrium problems: i) games with individual constraints only (Sec. 3.1 below); and ii) games with
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individual and global constraints (Sec. 3.1 and Sec. 3.3 below). The former formulation is suitable for
modeling scenarios where the SUs are selfish users who are not willing to cooperate, whereas the latter
class of games is applicable to the design of systems where the SUs can exchange limited signaling in favor
of better performance. Indeed, being less conservative than individual interference constraints, global
interference constraints are expected to yield better performance of the SUs at the cost of more signaling.
The aforementioned formulations are thus applicable to complementary CR scenarios.
3.1 Game with local interference constraints
In the proposed game, each SU is modeled as a player who aims to maximize his own opportunistic
throughput Rq
(
τq, p, P
fa
q
)
by choosing jointly a proper power allocation strategy pq = (pq,k)
N
k=1, sensing
time τq, and false alarm rate P
fa
q , subject to power and individual probabilistic interference constraints.
Stated in mathematical terms we have the following formulation.
Player q’s optimization problem is to determine, for given p−q , ((pr(k)
N
k=1)
Q
q 6=r=1 ≥ 0, a
tuple
(
τq, pq, P
fa
q
)
in order to
maximize
τq ,pq,P faq
Rq
(
τq, p, P
fa
q
)
subject to
(a)
N∑
k=1
Pmissq,k (P
fa
q , τq) · wq,k · pq,k ≤ Imaxq ,
(b) P
fa
q ≤ βq, and Pmissq,k (P faq , τq) ≤ αq,k, ∀k = 1, · · · , N,
(c) pq ∈ Pq and τminq ≤ τq ≤ τmaxq .
(9)
In (9) we also included additional lower and upper bounds of τq satisfying 0 < τ
min
q < τ
max
q < Tq
and upper bounds on detection and missed detection probabilities 0 < αq,k ≤ 1/2 and 0 < βq ≤ 1/2,
respectively. These bounds provide additional degrees of freedom to limit the probability of interference
to the PUs as well as to maintain a certain level of opportunistic spectrum utilization from the SUs
[1 − P faq ≥ 1 − βq]. Note that the constraints αq,k ≤ 1/2 and βq ≤ 1/2 do not represent a real loss of
generality, because practical CR systems are required to satisfy even stronger constraints on false alarm
and detection probabilities; for instance, in the WRAN standard, αq,k = βq,k = 0.1.
3.2 Game with global interference constraints
We add now global interference constraints to the game theoretical formulation in (9). This introduces
a new challenge: how to enforce global interference constraints in a distributed way? By imposing a
coupling among the transmissions and the sensing strategies of all the SUs, global interference constraints
in principle would call for a centralized optimization. To overcome this issue, we introduce a pricing
mechanism in the game, based on the relaxation of the coupling interference constraints as penalty term
in the SUs’ objective functions, so that the interference generated by all the SUs will depend on these
prices. Prices are thus addition variables to be optimized (there is one common price associated with any
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of the global interference constraints); they must be chosen so that any solution of the game will satisfy
the global interference constraints, which requires the introduction of additional constraints on the prices,
in the form of price clearance conditions. Denoting by π the price variable associated with the global
interference constraint (8), we have the following formulation.
Player q’s optimization problem is to determine, for given p−q ≥ 0 and π, a tuple
(
τq, pq, P
fa
q
)
such
that
maximize
τq,pq ,P faq
Rq
(
τq, p, P
fa
q
)− π · N∑
k=1
Pmissq,k (P
fa
q , τq) · wq,k · pq,k
subject to constraints (a), (b), (c) as in (9).
(10)
Price equilibrium: The price π obeys the following complementarity condition:
0 ≤ π ⊥ Imax −
N∑
k=1
Q∑
q=1
Pmissq,k (P
fa
q , τq) · wq,k · pq,k ≥ 0. (11)
In (11), the compact notation 0 ≤ a ⊥ b ≥ 0 means a ≥ 0, b ≥ 0, and a · b = 0. The price clearance
conditions (11) state that global interference constraints (8) must be satisfied together with nonnegative
price; in addition, they imply that if the global interference constraint holds with strict inequality then
the price should be zero (no penalty is needed). Thus, at any solution of the game, the optimal price is
such that the global interference constraint is satisfied.
3.3 The equi-sensing case
The decision model proposed in Sec. 2.1 is based on the assumption that the SUs are somehow able to
distinguish between primary and secondary signaling. This can be naturally accomplished if there is a
common sensing time (still to optimize) during which all the SUs stay silent while sensing the spectrum.
However, the formulation (10), in general, leads to different optimal sensing times of the SUs, implying
that some SU may start transmitting while some others are still in the sensing phase. To overcome this
issue, several directions have been explored in the companion paper [26], under the model (10)-(11). Here
we follow the approach of modifying the formulation in (10) in order to “force” in a distributed way the
same optimal sensing time for all the SUs. Roughly speaking, the idea is to perturb the payoff functions of
the players by a penalty term that discourages the players to deviate from equi-sensing strategies. Stated
in mathematical terms, we have the following formulation.
Player q’s optimization problem is to determine, for given c ≥ 0, p−q ≥ 0, (τr)Qq 6=r=1 ≥ 0 and π ≥ 0,
a tuple
(
τq, pq, P
fa
q
)
in order to
maximize
τq ,pq,P
q
fa
Rq
(
τq, p, P
fa
q
)− π · N∑
k=1
Pmissq,k (P
fa
q , τq) · wq,k · pq,k −
c
2
·
(
τq − 1
Q
Q∑
r=1
τr
)2
subject to constraints (a), (b), (c) as in (9).
(12)
Price equilibrium: The price π obeys the complementarity condition (11).
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The third term in the objective function of each SU in (12) helps to induce the same optimal sensing
time for all the SUs. Roughly speaking, one expects that for sufficiently large c, the aforementioned term
will become the dominant term in the objective functions of the SUs, leading thus to solutions of the game
having sensing times that differ from their average by any prescribed accuracy. This intuition has been
made formal in our companion paper [26] for stationary solutions of the game (12), and it can be similarly
extended to the Nash equilibria; we omit the details because of space limitation.
3.4 Unified formulation and summary of notation
In this section, we introduce a compact and unified formulation of the proposed games that simplifies
their analysis. Let us start by separating the convex constraints in the feasible set of the players from
the nonconvex ones. The interference constraints (a) in (9) are bi-convex and thus not convex, whereas
constraints (b) are convex in P faq and
√
τq. This motivates the following change of variables:
τq 7→ τ̂q ,
√
τq fq q = 1, . . . , Q, (13)
so that the constraints on Pmissq,k (P
fa
q , τq) in each player’s feasible set become convex in the tuple (P
fa
q , τ̂q)
[with P faq ≤ βq ]. Indeed, for each k = 1, . . . , N , we have
Pmissq,k (P
fa
q , τq) ≤ αq,k ⇔
σq,k|0
σq,k|1
Q−1 (P faq )− τ̂q µq,k|1 − µq,k|0σq,k|1 ≤ Q−1 (1− αq,k) , (14)
where Q−1 (·) denotes the inverse of the Q-function [Q(x) is a strictly decreasing function on R], which
are convex constraints in (P faq , τ̂q) [provided that P
fa
q ≤ βq ]. Using the above transformation, we can
equivalently rewrite the missed detection probability Pmissq,k (P
fa
q , τq) and the throughput Rq(τq, p, P
fa
q )
of each player q in terms of the tuples
(
τ̂q, pq, P
fa
q
)
’s, denoted by P̂missq,k (P
fa
q , τ̂q) and R̂q(τ̂q, p, P
fa
q ),
respectively; the explicit expression of these quantities is:
Pmissq,k (P
fa
q , τq) = P̂
miss
q,k (P
fa
q , τ̂q) , Q
(
σq,k|0Q−1
(
P faq
)− (µq,k|1 − µq,k|0 ) τ̂q
σq,k|1
)
(15)
Rq
(
τq, p, P
fa
q
)
= R̂q
(
τ̂q, p, P
fa
q
)
, log
((
1− τ̂
2
q
fq Tq
)
N∑
k=1
(
1− P faq,k
)
rq,k (p)
)
. (16)
To incorporate the equi-sensing case in our unified formulation, we introduce the functions θq(xq, x−q),
which represent the objective functions of the users including the equi-sensing term, with (τ̂ , p, P fa) ,(
(τ̂q, pq, P
fa
q )
)Q
q=1
denoting the strategy profile of all the players:
θq(τ̂ , p, P
fa) , Rˆq(τ̂q, p, P
fa
q )−
c
2
(
τ̂q√
fq
− 1
Q
Q∑
r=1
τ̂r√
fr
)2
. (17)
We can now rewrite the feasible set of each player’s optimization problem in terms of the new variables(
τ̂q, pq, P
fa
q
)
, denoted by Xq: for each q = 1, . . . , Q, let
Xq ,
{(
τ̂q, pq, P
fa
q
) ∈ Yq | Iq (τ̂q, pq, P faq ) ≤ 0} (18)
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where we have separated the convex part and the nonconvex part; the convex part is given by the poly-
hedron Yq corresponding to the constraints (b) and (c) in (9) under the transformation (13) [cf. (14)]:
Yq ,

(
τ̂q, pq, P
fa
q
) | P faq ≤ βq, σq,k|0σq,k|1Q−1 (P faq )− τ̂q µq,k|1 − µq,k|0σq,k|1 ≤ α̂q,k, ∀k = 1, . . . , N
pq ∈ Pq, τ̂ minq ≤ τ̂q ≤ τ̂ maxq
 ,
(19)
with
α̂q,k , Q−1 (1− αq,k) , τ̂ maxq ,
√
τ maxq fq, and τ̂
min
q ,
√
τ minq fq, (20)
whereas the nonconvex part in (18) is given by the constraint (a) that we have rewritten as Iq(τ̂q, pq, P
fa
q ) ≤
0 by introducing the local interference violation function
Iq
(
τ̂q, pq, P
fa
q
)
,
N∑
k=1
P̂missq,k
(
P faq , τ̂q
) · wq,k · pq,k − Imaxq . (21)
This measures the violation of the local interference constraint (a) at (τ̂q, pq, P
fa
q ). Similarly, it is con-
venient to introduce also the global interference violation function I(τ̂ , p, P fa), which depends on the
strategy profile (τ̂ , p, P fa) of all the players:
I(τ̂ , p, P fa) ,
N∑
k=1
Q∑
q=1
P̂missq,k
(
P faq , τ̂q
) · wq,k · pq,k − Imax; (22)
I(τ̂ , p, P fa) measures the violation of the global interference constraint (8) at (τ̂ , p, P fa); global inter-
ference constraints (8) can be then rewritten in terms of I(τ̂ , p, P fa) as I(τ̂ , p, P fa) ≤ 0.
Based on the above definitions, throughout the paper, we will use the following notation. The convex
part of the joint strategy set is denoted by Y , ∏Qq=1 Yq, whereas the set containing all the (convex
part of) players’ strategy sets except the q-th one is denoted by Y−q ,
∏
r 6=q Yr; similarly, we define
X ,∏Qq=1 Xq and X−q ,∏r 6=q Xr. For notational simplicity, when it is needed, we will use interchangeably
either (τ̂q, pq, P
fa
q ) or xq , (τ̂q, pq, P
fa
q ) to denote the strategy tuple of player q; similarly, the strategy
profile of all the players will be denoted either by x , (xq)
Q
q=1 or (τ̂ , p, P
fa), with τ̂ , (τ̂ q)
Q
q=1, p ,
(pq)
Q
q=1, and P
fa , (P faq )
Q
q=1, whereas x−q , (xr)
Q
q 6=r=1 is the strategy profile of all the players except
the q-th one. All the tuples above are intended to be column vectors; for instance, (τ̂ , p, P fa) signifies
(τ̂ , p, P fa) = [τ̂ T , pT , P fa
T
]T , with τ̂ , (τ̂ q)
Q
q=1 = [τ̂1, . . . , τ̂Q]
T , p , (pq)
Q
q=1 = [p
T
1 , . . . ,p
T
Q]
T , where
each pq = (pq,k)
N
k=1 = [pq,1, . . . , pq,N ]
T , and P fa = (P faq )
Q
q=1 = [P
fa
1 , . . . , P
fa
Q ]
T . For future convenience,
Table 1 collects the above definitions and symbols. Using the above notation, the games introduced in the
previous sections can be unified under the following reformulation.
Players’ optimization. The optimization problem of player q is:
maximize
xq
θq(xq, x−q)− π · I(x)
subject to xq ,
(
τ̂q, pq, P
fa
q
) ∈ Xq. (23)
Price equilibrium. The price obeys the following complementarity condition:
0 ≤ π ⊥ −I(x) ≥ 0. (24)
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Throughout the paper, we will refer to the game (23) along with the side constraint (24) as game
G(X , θ), where θ , (θq(xq,x−q, π))Qq=1.
Table 1: Glossary of notation of game G(X , θ) [cf. (23)-(24)]
Symbol Meaning
τq sensing time of SU q
pq , (pq,k)
N
k=1 power allocation vector of SU q
π scalar price variable
P faq false alarm probability of SU q
Pmissq,k missed detection probability of SU q on carrier k [cf. (3)]
τ̂q ,
√
τqfq normalized sensing time of SU q [cf. (13)]
xq , (τ̂q, pq, P
fa
q ) strategy tuple of SU q
x−q , (τ̂r, pr, P
fa
r )r 6=q strategy profile of all the SUs except the q-th one
x , (xq)
Q
q=1 = (τ̂ , p, P
fa) strategy profile of all the SUs
θq(xq, x−q) payoff function of SU q including the equisensing penalization [cf. (17)]
Iq(xq) local interference constraint violation of SU q [cf. (21)]
I(x) global interference constraint violation of SU q [cf. (22)]
Xq, X ,
∏Q
q=1Xq feasible set of SU q [cf. (18)], joint feasible strategy set of G(X , θ)
X−q ,
∏
r 6=q Xr joint strategy set of the SUs except the q-th one
Yq, Y ,
∏Q
q=1 Yq convex part of Xq [cf. (19)], Cartesian product of all Yq’s
Needless to say, when π = 0 and c = 0, G(X , θ) reduces to the game in (9) where there are only
individual interference constraints (7), whereas when c = 0, G(X , θ) coincides with the game in (10)-(11)
with local and global interference constraints.
As a final remark, we observe that the proposed formulations may be extended to cover more general
settings, without affecting the validity of the results we are going to present. For instance, the case of
multiple active PUs and additional local/global interference constraints (such as per-carrier constraints)
can be readily accommodated: Instead of having a single price variable, we associate a different price
to each global interference constraint and proceed similarly as in (23)-(24). Also, the sensing model
introduced in Sec. 2.1 can be generalized to the case of multiple active PUs, and the presence of device-
level uncertainties (e.g., uncertainty in the power spectral density of the PUs’ signals and thermal noise) as
well as system level uncertainties (e.g., lack of knowledge of the number of active PUs). The mathematical
details of these more general formulations can be found in our companion paper [26]; for notational
simplicity, here we will stay within the formulation (23)-(24), without loss of generality.
4 Solution Analysis: Nash Equilibria
This section is devoted to the solution analysis of the games introduced in the previous section. In order
to provide a unified analysis, we focus on the general game G(X , θ) with side constraints; results for the
other proposed formulations are obtained as special cases. We start our analysis by studying the feasibility
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of each optimization problem in (23) (cf. Sec. 4.1); we then extend the definitions of NE to a game with
side constraints and establish its main properties (cf. Sec. 4.2).
4.1 Feasibility conditions
Introducing the SNR detection snrdq,k , σ
2
Iq,k
/σ2q,k experimented by SU q over carrier k and using the
definitions given in Sec. 2.1, sufficient conditions guaranteeing the existence of an optimal solution for
each player’s optimization problem (23) are the following: For all q = 1, . . . , Q and k = 1, . . . , N , there
must exist a common sensing time τ (corresponding to normalized sensing times τ̂q =
√
τ fq) such that
τ̂minq√
fq
≤ √τ ≤ τ̂
max
q√
fq
, and
√
fqτ ≥
Q−1(βq,k) + |Q−1(αq,k)|
(
σq,k|1/σq,k|0
)
snrdq,k
. (25)
The first set of conditions in (25) simply postulates the existence of an overlap among the (normalized)
sensing time intervals [τ̂minq /
√
fq, τ̂
max
q /
√
fq] in (23), which is necessary to guarantee the existence of a
common value for the sensing times in the original variables τq’s. The second set of conditions guarantees
that the strategy sets Yq’s (and thus Xq’s) are not empty. Interestingly, they quantify the existing trade-off
between the sensing time (the product “time-bandwidth” fqτ of the system) and detection accuracy: the
smaller both false alarm and missed detection probability values, the larger the sensing time (the decision
process must be more accurate).
When the sensing times are not forced to be the same, as in the formulations (9) and (10)-(11), the
feasibility conditions (25) can be weakened by the following: For all q = 1, . . . , Q and k = 1, . . . , N ,
√
fqτmaxq ≥
Q−1(βq,k) + |Q−1(αq,k)|
(
σq,k|1/σq,k|0
)
snrdq,k
. (26)
Throughout the paper, we tacitly assume that each user’s optimization problem under consideration has
a nonempty strategy set (the associated feasibility conditions above are satisfied).
4.2 Existence and uniqueness of the NE
We focus in this section on the NE of G(X , θ). The definition of NE for a game with price equilibrium
conditions such as G(X , θ) is the natural generalization of the same concept introduced for classical
noncooperative games having no side constraints (see, e.g., [27]) and is given next.
Definition. A Nash equilibrium of the game G(X , θ) is a strategy-price tuple (x⋆, π), such that
x⋆q ∈ argmax
xq ∈Xq
{
θq(xq,x
⋆
−q)− π⋆ · I(xq,x⋆−q)
}
, ∀q = 1, . . . , Q, (27)
and
0 ≤ π⋆ ⊥ − I(x⋆) ≥ 0. (28)
A NE is said to be trivial if the power-component p⋆q = 0 for all q = 1, . . . , Q. 
In words, the proposed notion of equilibrium is a stable state of the network consisting of an equilibrium
power/sensing profile x⋆ and price π⋆: at (x⋆, π⋆), the SUs have no incentive to change their power/sensing
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profiles x⋆ based on the current state of the network [represented by (27)], while the optimal value π⋆ of
the price is such that all global interference constraints are met [a situation represented by (28)]. Note
that, for a set of fixed price π⋆, the equilibrium power/sensing profile x⋆ can be interpreted as the NE of
a classical noncooperative game (having thus only local constraints), wherein the payoff function of each
player q is θq(•,x−q, π⋆) and the strategy set is Xq. The proposed equilibrium concept is thus a NE of the
aforementioned game with an appropriately selected price.
The game G(X , θ) is nonconvex with the nonconvexity occurring in the players’ objective functions
and the local/global interference constraints; moreover, the feasible price [satisfying (28)] is not explicitly
bounded [note that this price cannot be normalized due to the lack of homogeneity in the players’ opti-
mization problem (23)]. Because of that, the existence of a NE is in jeopardy. The rest of this section is
then devoted to provide a detailed solution analysis of the game; we derive sufficient conditions for the
existence and the uniqueness of a NE.
Mathematically, a NE can be interpreted as a fixed-point of the players’ best-response map. When
this map is a continuous single valued function, the existence of a fixed-point can be proved by using
the renowned Brouwer fixed-point theorem1 (see, e.g., [35, Th. 2.1.18]), provided that one can identify
a convex compact set for the application of the theorem. Our goal is then to derive a set of sufficient
conditions under which the best-response map associated with G(X , θ) is a single-valued continuous map
over a proper compact and convex set; this is a nontrivial task, because of the nonconvexity of the players’
optimization problems and the potential unboundedness of the price. The new line of analysis we propose
is based on the following three steps:
Step 1 : To deal with the unboundedness of the price, we introduce an auxiliary price-truncated game
Gt(X , θ), where the price π is constrained to be upper bounded by a given positive constant t;
Step2 : We derive sufficient conditions for the nonconvex players’ optimization problems in the game
Gt(X , θ) to have unique optimal solutions; building on such solutions we introduce a continuous
single-value map−the best-response associated with the game Gt(X , θ)−defined on a convex and
compact set, whose fixed-points are the Nash equilibria of the game Gt(X , θ). We can then apply
the Brouwer fixed-point theorem to deduce that Gt(X , θ) has a NE;
Step3 : The final step is to demonstrate that there exists a sufficiently large t such that the price trun-
cation in the game Gt(X , θ) is not binding. This will allow us to deduce that a NE of Gt(X , θ) is
also a NE of the original, un-truncated, game G(X , θ).
Step 1: The price-truncated game Gt(X , θ)
To motivate the price-truncated game, observe first that the price complementarity condition in (28) is
equivalent to
π⋆ ∈ argmax
π≥0
{π · I(x⋆)} . (29)
1Brouwer fixed-point theorem states that every continuous (vector-valued) function Φ : C 7→ C defined over a nonempty
convex compact set C ⊆ Rn has a fixed point in C.
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In order to bound the price π in (29), let us introduce the price interval defined as: given t > 0,
St , {π | 0 ≤ π ≤ t} , (30)
and truncate in (29) the nonnegative axis π ≥ 0 by St. We then replace (29) with the following price-
truncated optimization problem:
π⋆t ∈ argmax
πt∈St
{πt · I(x⋆)} , (31)
where instead of π we used πt to make explicit the dependence of the optimal solution of (31) on t. Using
(31), the price-truncated game Gt(X , θ) can be defined as follows.
Game Gt(X , θ). The game is composed of Q+1 players’ optimization problems: the following nonconvex
optimization problems for the Q players
maximize
xq∈Xq
θq (xq, x−q)− πt · I(x), q = 1, . . . , Q, (32)
and the price-truncated optimization problem for the (Q+ 1)-st player
maximize
πt∈St
πt · I(x). (33)
Note that in the game Gt(X , θ) there are no side constraints, but the price complementarity condition
in (28) is treated as an additional player of the game, at the same level of the other Q players. In fact,
this formulation facilitates the solution analysis of the game, as detailed next.
Let us start our analysis by rewriting the NE of Gt(X , θ) as fixed-points of a proper best-response
map defined on a convex and compact set, which allows us to apply standard fixed-point arguments.
Given t ≥ 0, suppose that each optimization problem in (32) has a unique optimal solution for every fixed
x−q ∈ Y−q and πt ∈ St (we derive shortly conditions for this assumption to hold; see Proposition 2 below);
let denote such a solution by x⋆q(x−q, πt), i.e.,
x⋆q(x−q, πt) , argmax
zq∈Xq
{θq (zq, x−q)− πt · I(zq,x−q)} , (34)
where in (34) we made explicit the dependence of x⋆q(x−q, πt) on the strategy profile x−q of the other
players and the price πt. In order to have a unique solution also of the price-truncated linear optimization
problem (33), we introduce the following proximal-based regularization in (33): given t ≥ 0, x ∈ Y, and
πt ∈ St, let
π⋆t (x, πt) , argmax
µt∈St
{
µt · I(x)− 1
2
(µt − πt)2
}
. (35)
Note that, thanks to the proximal regularization, the optimization problem in (35) becomes strongly
convex for any given (x, πt), and thus has a unique solution π
⋆
t (x, πt), which depends on (x, πt). Building
on (34) and (35), we can introduce the following best-response map B : Y × St → Y × St associated with
the price-truncated game Gt(X , θ):
Y × St ∋ (x, πt) ,

x1
...
xQ
πt
 7→ B(x, πt) ,

x⋆1(x−1, πt)
...
x⋆Q(x−q, πt)
π⋆t (x, πt)
 . (36)
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Note that, even though the feasible sets Xq of the players’ optimization problems in (32) are nonconvex,
the map B(•) is defined over the convex and compact set Y×St; which is a key point to apply the Brouwer
fixed-point theorem. Moreover, the set of fixed-points of B(•) coincides with that of the NE of the game
Gt(X , θ), establishing thus the desired connection between the map (36) and the game Gt(X , θ). More
formally, we have the following.
Lemma 1. Suppose that each optimization problem in (34) has a unique optimal solution for every given
x−q ∈ Y−q and πt ∈ St. A tuple (x⋆, π⋆t ) is a NE of Gt(X , θ) if and only if it is a fixed-point of the map
B(•); that is (x⋆, π⋆t ) = B (x⋆, π⋆t ).
Based on Lemma 1, we can now study the existence of a NE of Gt(X , θ) by focusing on the fixed-points
of the map B.
Step 2: Existence of a NE of Gt(X , θ)
We provide now sufficient conditions guaranteeing that each nonconvex problem (32) has a unique optimal
solution, for every given x−q ∈ Y−q and πt ∈ St. Then, we show that these conditions are also sufficient
for the existence of a fixed-point of the map B in (36), and thus a NE of the game Gt(X , θ).
It is well-known that, under some Constraint Qualification (CQ), a locally/globally optimal solution of
a (possibly nonconvex) nonlinear program satisfies the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions associated
with the optimization problem; such solutions are called stationary solutions of the optimization problem.
It turns out that to establish the single-valuedness of the players’ best-response map it is enough to derive
conditions guaranteeing the uniqueness of the stationary solutions, provided that a suitable CQ holds. The
classical approach to write the KKT conditions of each player’s optimization problem would be introducing
multipliers associated with all the constraints in the set Xq−both the convex part Yq and the nonconvex
part Iq(xq) ≤ 0 [cf. (18)]−and then maximizing the resulting Lagrangian function over the whole space
(i.e., considering an unconstrained optimization problem for the Lagrangian maximization). The study
of the uniqueness of the stationary solutions based on the “standard” KKT conditions is however not an
easy task. To simplify the analysis, we propose here a different approach: instead of explicitly accounting
all the multipliers as variables of the KKT system, for each player’s optimization problem, we introduce
multipliers only for the nonconvex constraints Iq(xq) ≤ 0, and retain the convex part Yq as explicit
constraints in the maximization of the resulting Lagrangian function. More specifically, denoting by λq
the multiplier associated with the nonconvex constraint Iq(xq) ≤ 0 of player q, the Lagrangian function
associated with the optimization problem (32) of player q (rewritten as a minimization) is
Lq((xq, λq) , x−q, πt) , −θq(xq,x−q) + λq · Iq(xq) + πt · I(xq,x−q), (37)
which depends also on the strategies x−q of the other players and the price πt. Given x−q and πt, it is not
difficult to see that if x⋆q is an optimal solution of the q-th player’s optimization problem in (23) and some
CQ holds at x⋆q, there exists a multiplier λ
⋆
q associated with the local nonconvex constraint Iq(xq) ≤ 0
such that the tuple
(
x⋆q , λ
⋆
q
)
satisfies
(i) : x⋆q ∈ argmin
xq ∈Yq
{Lq((xq, λ⋆q),x−q, πt)}
(ii) : 0 ≤ λ⋆q ⊥ − Iq(x⋆q) ≥ 0.
(38)
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Note that each Lagrangian minimization in (i) is constrained over the convex part Yq of the player’s local
constraints Xq. Since Yq is a convex set, we can invoke the variational principle for the optimality of x⋆q
in (i), and obtain the following necessary conditions for (38) to hold:
(i
′
) :
(
xq − x⋆q
)T ∇xqLq((x⋆q , λ⋆q), x−q, πt) ≥ 0 ∀xq ∈ Yq
(ii
′
) : (λq − λ⋆q) ·
(− Iq(x⋆q)) ≥ 0, ∀λq ∈ R+ (39)
where (i
′
) is just the aforementioned first-order (necessary) optimality condition of the (nonconvex) opti-
mization problem in (i), albeit with a convex feasible set Yq; and (ii′) is equivalent to (ii). Finally, since
there is no coupling in the constraints involving the variables xq and λq in (i
′
)-(ii
′
), we can equivalently
rewrite the two separated inequalities (i
′
)-(ii
′
) as one inequality, obtaining(
xq − x⋆q
λq − λq⋆
)T  ∇xqLq((x⋆q , λ⋆q), x−q, πt)
− Iq(x⋆q)

︸ ︷︷ ︸
,Fq
(
(x⋆q , λ
⋆
q); x−q, πt
)
≥ 0, ∀ (xq, λq) ∈ Yq × R+︸ ︷︷ ︸
,Kq
. (40)
The above system of inequalities defines the so-called VI problem in the variables (xq, λq) for fixed
(x−q, πt), whose defining vector function is Fq (•; x−q, πt) and feasible set is Kq, both defined in (40);2 such
a VI is denoted by VI(Kq,Fq). According to the implications (38)⇒(40), the VI(Kq,Fq) is an equivalent
reformulation of the KKT conditions of the q-th player’s optimization problem in (23), wherein the convex
constraints Yq’s (and thus the associated multipliers) have been absorbed in the VI set Kq, which is thus
convex. It turns out that the nonconvex problem in (23) has a unique optimal solution for any given x−q
and πt−the best-response of (36) is unique, and thus x⋆q(x−q, πt) is well-defined−if the VI(Kq,Fq) has a
unique xq-component solution and some CQ holds. Proposition 2 below shows that Abadie CQ [35, Ch. 3.2]
is satisfied by any nontrivial optimal solution of (23) and establishes the uniqueness of the xq-component
under the positive definiteness of the Hessian matrix ∇2xqLq ((xq, λq), x−q, πt) of Lq((xq, λq) , x−q, πt), for
all (xq, λq) ∈ Kq and any given x−q ∈ Y−q and πt ≥ 0. The matrix ∇2xqLq ((xq, λq), x−q, πt) [interpreted
as a function of (xq, λq), for fixed x−q and πt] is given by
∇2xqLq ((xq, λq), x−q, πt) , −∇2xqθq(xq,x−q) + λq · ∇2xqIq(xq) + πt · ∇2xqI(xq,x−q). (41)
Lemma 12 in Appendix A shows that all the λq-solutions of the VI(Kq,Fq) are bounded from above,
for every given x−q ∈ Yq and πt ∈ St. Specifically, it holds that any λ⋆q satisfies λ⋆q ∈ [0, λmax] (see Lemma
12 in Appendix A), with
λmax ,
Q∑
q=1
1/
[
min
1≤q≤Q
{
Imaxq , min
1≤k≤N
pmaxq,k
}]
 min1≤k≤N
 log
 1 + p
max
q,k
σ2q,k +
∑
r 6=q
|Hqr(k)|2 pmaxr,k


 min1≤k≤N {σ2q,k}
. (42)
2Given a set Q ⊆ Rn and a vector-valued function Ψ : Q → Rn, the VI(Q,Ψ) problem is to find a point z⋆ ∈ Q, termed
a solution of the VI, such that (z− z⋆)TΨ(z⋆) ≥ 0 for all z ∈ Q [35].
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This allows us to restrict the requirement on the positive definiteness of ∇2xqLq ((xq, λq), x−q, πt) on all
xq ∈ Yq and λq ∈ [0, λmax]. The above discussion is made formal in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Let x−q ∈ Y−q and πt ∈ St for some t > 0. Suppose that ∇2xqLq ((xq, λq), x−q, πt) in
(41) is positive definite for all xq ∈ Yq and λq ∈ [0, λmax]. Then, the q-th nonconvex optimization problem
in (32) has a unique optimal solution x⋆q ∈ Xq that is necessarily nontrivial.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Note that under conditions in the above proposition, the optimization problems in (32) remain non-
convex (the constraint set Xq is indeed nonconvex). To shed light on the physical interpretation of the
obtained result, we provide in Corollary 3 below easier conditions to be checked (but more restrictive)
under which Proposition 2 is true. To state the corollary, we use as weights wq,k’s involved in the interfer-
ence constraints (7) and (8) the cross-channels between secondary and primary users, i.e., wq,k = GP,q(k),
for all q = 1, . . . , Q and k = 1, . . . , Q (more general conditions are given in Appendix A).
Corollary 3. Proposition 2 holds if the following sufficient condition is satisfied:
γ(1)q · max
k=1,...,N
{ |GP,q(k)|2
I tot
}
< 1, (43)
where γ
(1)
q is a positive constant that depends only on system/sensing parameters and it is defined in (102)
(cf. Appendix B)
Proof. See Appendix B.
The condition in (43) has an interesting physical interpretation: the nonconvex problem in (32) has
a unique solution provided that the (normalized) cross-channels between the secondary and the primary
users are “sufficiently” small, meaning that there is not “too much” interference at the primary receivers;
see Sec. 4.3 for more details on the physical interpretation of the above conditions.
Based on Proposition 2 and Lemma 1, we can now establish the existence of a NE of the game Gt(X , θ)
invoking the existence of a fixed-point of the single-valued mapping B(•) defined in (36).
Proposition 4. Given t > 0, suppose that each matrix ∇2xqLq ((xq, λq), x−q, πt) in (41) is positive definite
for all (xq, λq) ∈ Yq × [0, λmax], x−q ∈ Yq, and πt ∈ St. Then, the game Gt(X , θ) has a (nontrivial) NE.
Proof. Under the positive definiteness of each matrix ∇2xqLq ((xq, λq), x−q, πt), the optimization problems
(34) and (35) have a unique optimal solutions x⋆q(x−q, πt)’s and π
⋆
t (x, πt), respectively, for any given
x ∈ Y and πt ∈ St. Since these optimal solutions are unique, it is not difficult to show that they are
continuous functions of the parameters (x, πt) (see, e.g., [39]), implying that the single-valued map B
in (36) is a continuous function on the convex and compact set Y × St. It follows from the Brouwer
fixed-point theorem, that B has a fixed-point, which is a NE of the game Gt(X , θ) (Lemma 1). It follows
from Proposition 2 that such a NE must be nontrivial.
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Step 3: Existence and uniqueness of a NE of the game G(X , θ)
To pass from a NE of the price-truncated game Gt(X , θ) to a NE of the original game G(X , θ), we argue
that there exists a sufficiently large t > 0 such that the truncation constraint πt ≤ t in St is not binding
at the optimal solution π⋆t of the price-truncated optimization problem (35), corresponding to a NE of
Gt(X , θ). This implies that a NE of Gt(X , θ) is also a NE of G(X , θ) and, as such, existence conditions
given in Proposition 4 for the game Gt(X , θ) apply also to G(X , θ). This is made formal in Theorem 5
below, where we derive sufficient conditions for the existence and uniqueness of a NE of G(X , θ).
To introduce the theorem, we follow a similar approach as in Step 2: i) we first write the KKT
conditions associated with the game Gt(X , θ), which under some CQ, are necessary conditions for a tuple
(x⋆, π⋆t ) to be a NE of Gt(X , θ) along with some multipliers associated with the local nonconvex constraints
{Iq(xq) ≤ 0, q = 1, . . . , Q} and the truncation in St; and then ii) we rewrite this KKT system as a proper
VI problem, whose solution analysis leads to the desired results (c.f. Theorem 5).
Under a suitable CQ, every NE (x⋆, π⋆t ) of Gt(X , θ) will satisfy the KKT conditions of the game,
which are obtained by aggregating the KKT conditions of players’ optimization problems in (32) and (33).
Denoting by λ⋆q and η
⋆
t the multipliers associated with the nonconvex constraint Iq(x
⋆
q) ≤ 0 of player q
and the price truncation π⋆t ≤ t in St, respectively, and proceeding as in (38)-(40), the KKT conditions of
Gt(X , θ) that are necessarily satisfied by any NE (x⋆, π⋆t ) can be written as:
(i) :

x1 − x⋆1
...
xQ − x⋆Q

T 
∇x1L1
(
(x⋆1, λ
⋆
1), x
⋆
−1, π
⋆
t
)
...
∇xQLQ
(
(x⋆Q, λ
⋆
Q), x
⋆
−Q, π
⋆
t
)
 ≥ 0, ∀xq ∈ Yq and q = 1, . . . , Q,
(ii) :

(λ1 − λ⋆1)
...
(λQ − λ⋆Q)

T 
− I1(x⋆1)
...
− IQ(x⋆Q)
 ≥ 0, ∀λq ≥ 0 and q = 1, . . . , Q
(iii) : 0 ≤ π⋆t ⊥ −I(x⋆) + η⋆t ≥ 0 and 0 ≤ η⋆t ⊥ t− π⋆t ≥ 0.
(44)
Observing that the complementarity conditions in (iii) of (44) are equivalent to the VI problem in the πt
variable:
(πt − π⋆t ) · (−I(x⋆)) ≥ 0, ∀πt ∈ St,
the KKT system (44) can be equivalently rewritten as

x− x⋆
λ− λ⋆
πt − π⋆t

T

(∇xqLq((x⋆q, λ⋆q), x⋆−q, π⋆t ))Qq=1(−Iq(x⋆q))Qq=1
−I(x⋆)

︸ ︷︷ ︸
,Ψ(x⋆,λ⋆, π⋆t )
≥ 0, ∀(x, λ, πt) ∈ Y × RQ+ × St︸ ︷︷ ︸
,Zt
,
(45)
which represents a VI problem in the tuple (x, λ, πt), i.e., VI(Zt, Ψ), with x = (xq)Qq=1 and λ , (λq)Qq=1.
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Based on the VI formulation (45), in Appendix C we prove that the following two properties are
satisfied by any solutions (x⋆, λ⋆, π⋆t ) of VI(Zt, Ψ) and thus by any NE of Gt(X , θ) (under some suitable
CQ): i) at any (x⋆, λ⋆, π⋆t ), π
⋆
t is bounded from above by π
⋆
t ≤ λmax, with λmax defined in (42); and ii)
the x-component of (x⋆, λ⋆, π⋆t ) is unique if the Jacobian matrix of
(∇xqLq((xq, λq), x−q, πt))Qq=1 with
respect to x, denoted by A(x, λ, πt), is positive definite on Y × [0, λmax]Q × St, with A(x, λ, πt) given
by:
A(x, λ, πt) , Jx

∇x1L1((x1, λ1), x−1, πt)
...
∇xQLQ((xQ, λQ), x−Q, πt)
 . (46)
Building on the established connection between the NE of Gt(X , θ) and the solutions of the VI(Zt, Ψ)
and using properties i) and ii) above, we can finally obtain the desired existence and uniqueness result:
(a) It follows from property i) that since the truncated game Gt(X , θ) has a NE for t > λmax (which is
guaranteed under conditions in Proposition 4), the original game G(X , θ) must have a NE as well; and
(b) According to property ii), if there exists a t > λmax such that A(x, λ, πt) is positive definite for
all (x, λ, πt) ∈ Y × RQ+ × St, the x-component of the solution of the VI(Zt, Ψ)−and thus of the NE of
G(X , θ)−is unique. These results are collected in Theorem 5 below and formally proved in Appendix C.
Theorem 5. Given the game G(X , θ) and λmax defined in (42), the following hold:
(a) Suppose that there exists a t > λmax such that each matrix ∇2xqLq ((xq, λq), x−q, πt) in (41) is positive
definite for all (xq, λq) ∈ Yq× [0, λmax], x−q ∈ Yq, and πt ∈ St. Then, every NE (x⋆, π⋆t ) of Gt(X , θ)
is a NE of G(X , θ); therefore G(X , θ) has a NE;
(b) If the condition in (a) is strengthened by the following: the matrix A(x, λ, πt) in (46) is positive
definite for all x ∈ Y, λ ∈ [0, λmax]Q, and πt ∈ St, then the x-component of the NE of the game
G(X , θ) is unique.
Proof. See Appendix C.
Sufficient conditions for the matrix A(x, λ, πt) to be positive definite are given in the following.
Corollary 6. Statement (b) [and thus also (a)] of Theorem 5 true if the following sufficient conditions
are satisfied: for all q = 1, . . . , Q,
γ(1)q · max
k=1,...,N
{ |GPq(k)|2
I tot
}
+ γ(2)q ·
∑
r 6=q
(
max
k=1,...,N
{
|Hqr(k)|2
σ2q,k
}
+ max
k=1,...,N
{
|Hrq(k)|2
σ2r,k
})
< 1, (47)
where γ
(1)
q and γ
(2)
q are positive constants depending only on system/sensing parameters and are defined
in (102) and (119), respectively (cf. Appendix D).
Proof. See Appendix D.
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4.3 Discussion on the existence/uniqueness conditions
Corollary 3 and Corollary 6 suggest an intuitive physical interpretation of the equilibrium existence/uniqueness
conditions: existence of an equilibrium and uniqueness of the x-component are ensured if the MUI in
the network is sufficiently small (compared to the background noise). More specifically, existence re-
sults in (43) impose a limit (only) on the maximum interference that the the SUs are allowed to gen-
erate at the primary receivers, measured by max
k=1,...,N
{|GPq(k)|2/I tot}. Uniqueness conditions in (47)
impose instead a limit on the maximum MUI experienced at both primary and secondary receivers.
This is clear looking at the LHS of (47): the first term on the LHS, max
k=1,...,N
{|GPq(k)|2/I tot}, co-
incides with that of (43), imposing thus a limit on the MUI at the PU, whereas the second term,∑
r 6=q max
k=1,...,N
{
|Hqr(k)|2/σ2q,k
}
+
∑
r 6=q max
k=1,...,N
{
|Hrq(k)|2/σ2r,k
}
, limits the overall MUI in the secondary
network; indeed, the quantity
∑
r 6=q max
k=1,...,N
{
|Hrq(k)|2/σ2r,k
}
is an estimate of the maximum interference
generated by each SU q against all the other SUs r’s, and
∑
r 6=q max
k=1,...,N
{|Hqr(k)|2/σ2q,k} can be inter-
preted as a limit on the maximum MUI tolerable by each secondary receiver q and generated by all the
other secondary transmitters r’s. These two sources of MUI affect the uniqueness through the constants
γ
(1)
q and γ
(2)
q , which depend on the fixed sensing/device-level parameters as well as on the SU/PUs’ QoS
requirements (e.g., maximum false alarm rate/minimum detection probability, and maximum sensing time
constraints).
Interestingly, conditions in (47) are of the same genre as those obtained in the literature to guarantee
the uniqueness of the NE of convex games modeling the power control problem in ad-hoc networks [18,
40, 19, 20] and CR systems [41, 21]. The main difference is that, because of the nonconvexity of some
constraints and the joint optimization of sensing and transmission strategies, in (47), there is an extra term,
max
k=1,...,N
{|GPq(k)|2/I tot}, limiting the interference generated also against the PUs and the two weights
γ
(1)
q and γ
(2)
q capturing the sensing/QoS requirements.
5 Distributed Algorithms
This section is devoted to the design of distributed algorithms that solve the proposed class of games and
the study of their convergence. Before analyzing the most general game G(X , θ), we focus on solution
methods for the game where the price π is a fixed exogenous parameter (and thus there are only local
interference constraints). The resulting algorithms will be used as a subroutine in an extended iterative
algorithm solving the more complex game G(X , θ) wherein the prices are endogenous variables to optimize.
5.1 Game with exogenous price
When the price π is an exogenous fixed parameter, game G(X , θ) reduces to the following game.
Game Gπ(X , θ). The optimization problem of player q is: given x−q ∈ X−q and π ≥ 0,
maximize
xq∈Xq
θq (xq, x−q)− π · I(xq,x−q) q = 1, . . . , Q. (48)
We have denoted such a game by Gπ(X , θ), making explicit the fact that π is an exogenous fixed
21
parameter. Note that Gπ(X , θ) contains as special cases the game with zero price (and thus no global
interference constraints) as introduced in Sec. 3.1, and the equisensing game with constant price π (and
local interference constraints only), which is an instance of the game G(X , θ) introduced in Sec. 3.2.
Therefore, Algorithms for Gπ(X , θ) apply also to the aforementioned special cases.
We are interested in iterative schemes based on the best-response mapping: according to a given
scheduling (e.g., sequentially, simultaneously, or asynchronously), each SU solves his own optimization
problem in (48), given the strategies of the others. If this procedure converges and some suitable conditions
are satisfied, it will converge to a NE of the game Gπ(X , θ). The Jacobi version of the proposed class of
algorithms wherein the users update their strategies simultaneously is formally described in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1: Jacobi Best-Response-Consensus Algorithm for Gπ(X , θ)
(S.0) : Choose any feasible x(0) ∈ X and set n = 0.
(S.1) : If x(n) satisfies a suitable termination criterion: STOP.
(S.2) : Run a consensus algorithm to locally compute the average
1
Q
Q∑
r=1
τ̂
(n)
r√
fr
.
(S.3) : for q = 1, . . . , Q, compute
x(n+1)q ∈ argmax
xq∈Xq
{
θq
(
xq, x
(n)
−q
)
− π · I(xq,x−q)
}
. (49)
(S.4) : n← n+ 1; go to (S.1).
In order to relax constraints on the synchronization of the players’ updates, totally asynchronous
schemes (in the sense specified in [42]) can be considered, where some SUs may update their strategy profile
more frequently than others and they may even use an outdated measurement of the interference generated
by the others (we refer to [42] and [20] for a formal description of asynchronous algorithms). The analysis of
this general class of algorithms is addressed in Appendix E, where we provide sufficient conditions for their
convergence; see Theorem 16 and Corollary 17. Since Algorithm 1 is an instance of these asynchronous
schemes, it converges under the same aforementioned conditions. It is worth remarking that the obtained
convergence conditions have the same physical interpretation of that given for the existence/uniqueness
of the NE (cf. Sec. 4.3). Roughly speaking, they require “low” interference in the network, meaning
“small” values of the (normalized) secondary cross-channels |Hqr(k)|2/σ2q,k as well as secondary-primary
cross-channels |GPq(k)|2/I tot. Interestingly, they do not depend on the specific updating scheduling used
by the users, meaning that the whole class of asynchronous algorithms converges under the same set of
unified conditions. The main implication of this result is that all the algorithms obtained as special case
of the asynchronous scheme, such as the sequential (Gauss-Seidel scheme) and the simultaneous (Jacobi
scheme) best-response algorithms, are robust against missing or outdated updates of the players.
5.1.1 Discussion on the implementation
We discuss now some implementation issues related to the proposed algorithms; for notational simplic-
ity, we will focus only on Algorithm 1, but similar conclusions can be drawn also for the asynchronous
implementation.
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In Step 3 of the algorithm, each user q needs to compute its best-response, knowing the information
on the strategies of the others x
(n)
−q = (x
(n)
r )
Q
r 6=q=1, with each xr = (τ̂r,pr, P
fa
r ). Given the structure of the
feasible set Xq [specifically, the presence of local interference constraints (7)] and the functional dependence
of the objective function in (48) on x−q [see (23)], this knowledge requires each SU q to estimate: i) the
overall Power Spectral Density (PSD) of the MUI at each subcarrier,
∑
r 6=q |Hqr(k)|2pr,k; ii) the primary-
secondary cross-channel function (GPq(k))
N
k=1 [if the weights wq,k’s in the local interference constraints (7)
are chosen as wq,k = GPq(k)]; and iii) the average of the (normalized) sensing times (1/Q)
∑Q
r=1(τ̂r/
√
f
(r)
s )
of all the SUs. Among other remarks, we discuss next alternative distributed protocols to obtain these
estimates, each of them being characterized by a different level (albeit limited) of signaling among the
SUs and computational complexity.
Estimate of the MUI and the primary-secondary cross-channels
To measure the MUI in a totally distributed way, it is enough for the SUs to perform a preliminary
noise calibration of their receivers (during this phase of course the SUs must stay silent). After this
noise calibration phase, to acquire the MUI, the SUs just need to locally measure the global interference
experienced at their receivers. Note that this procedure does not require the SUs to be able to distinguish
between primary and secondary signaling.
Because of the presence of the individual interference constraints in the set Xq, each SU needs to
estimate also the secondary-primary cross-channel transfer function (GPq(k))
N
k=1 [if in (7) one uses wq,k =
GPq(k)]. This knowledge can be acquired by each SU in advance by using classical channel estimation
techniques, and updated at the rate of the channel coherence time. In the CR scenarios where the PUs
cannot communicate with the SUs (e.g., when the PUs are legacy systems) and thus cannot be involved
in the (cross-)channel estimation, and the primary receivers have a fixed geographical location, it may
be possible to install some monitoring devices close to each primary receiver having the functionality of
(cross-)channel/interference measurement.
In scenarios where the above options are not feasible and the channel state information cannot be
acquired, a different choice of the weights coefficients wq,k’s and the interference threshold I
max
q in (7) can
be made, based on worst-case channel/interference statistics. More specifically, one can replace the in-
stantaneous value of the secondary-primary cross-channel transfer function (GPq(k))
N
k=1 with its expected
value; the expected value of each GPq(k) is
E
{
|GPq(k)|2
}
=
σg
1 + (dPq/d0)
ς , (50)
where σg is a positive constant depending on the number of resolvable paths and their variance; ς is the
path loss exponent, which generally is 2 ≤ ς ≤ 6; dPq is the distance between the SU q and the PU; and
d0 is the Fraunhofer distance. The interference constraints imposed to each SU q become then
N∑
k=1
Pmissq,k
(
τq, P
fa
q
) · σg
1 + (dPq/d0)
ς · pq,k ≤ Imaxq , (51)
which is still in the form of (7), with weights coefficients wq,k = σg/(1 + (dPq/d0)
ς).
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When the distance dPq in (51) is unknown, one can instead consider a probabilistic (conservative)
version of (51), based on the worst-case interference scenario, as proposed in [43]. Modeling dPq as a
random variable, we can impose
Prob
{
N∑
k=1
Pmissq,k
(
τq, P
fa
q
) · σg
1 + (dPq/d0)
ς · pq,k ≤ Imaxq
}
≥ PI , (52)
where 0 ≤ PI ≤ 1 is a given positive constant guaranteeing the desired QoS at the primary receiver. To
obtain an explicit expression of the probability above, we consider next a more conservative constraint
implying (52). More specifically, denoting by dmin , minq dPq the distance between the PU and the
nearest SU q, the following interference constraint implies (52):
Prob
{
N∑
k=1
Pmissq,k
(
τq, P
fa
q
) · σg
1 + (dmin/d0)
ς · pq,k ≤ Imaxq
}
≥ PI . (53)
Assuming that the SUs are randomly distributed according to a homogeneous Poisson point process with
spatial density ρ, dmin , minq dPq is Rayleigh distributed; the probability in (53) can be then evaluated
in closed form and we obtain [43]
N∑
k=1
Pmissq,k
(
τq, P
fa
q
) · pq,k ≤ I¯maxq , with I¯maxq , Imaxqσg ·
(
1 +
|ln(PI)|
πρr20
)
(54)
which is still in the form of (7), where wq,k = 1 and the interference threshold I
max
q is replaced by I¯
max
q .
Estimate of the average sensing time [Step 2]
The average of the sensing times can be locally computed by each SU by running a consensus based
algorithm that requires the interaction only between nearby secondary nodes, as stated in Step 2. Con-
sensus algorithms have become popular over the past few decades since [44] as a practical scheme for the
in-network distributed calculation of general functions of the node values; several protocols suitable for dif-
ferent applications and working under different network settings have been proposed and their properties
analyzed; see, e.g., [45, 46] for a good overview of recent results. In order to minimize the running time of
the consensus iterates and thus the amount of signaling to be exchange in Step 2 by the SUs, we suggest
here to use the finite-time distributed convergence linear scheme proposed in [47]. The main advantage
of this scheme with respect to the more classical consensus/gossip algorithms whose convergence is only
asymptotic (i.e., exact consensus is not reached in a finite number of times) is that, at no extra signaling,
each node can immediately calculate the consensus value after observing the evolution of its own value
over a finite number of time-iterations (specifically, upper bounded by the size of the network).
The consensus scheme we consider in Step 2 of Algorithm 2 makes use of the following liner iterations:
given the (normalized) sensing times τ̂
(n)
q ’s obtained as output of Step 3 at iterations n, and setting
z
(0)
q = τ̂
(n)
q /
√
fq, each SU q updates at each (inner) time-iteration i its value as
z(i+1)q = aqq z
(i)
q +
∑
r∈Nq
aqr
(
z(i)r − z(i)q
)
(55)
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where Nq is the set of neighbors of user q, which are the nodes that interfere with node q (the SUs’ network
is modeled as a directed graph); the cardinality of Nq, the number of neighbors of node q, is denoted by
deginq , |Nq| (also called in the graph theory jargon the in-degree of node q); and the aqr’s are a set of
given coefficients. These weights represent a degree of freedom in the algorithm design; here we focus on
the following choice that can be made locally by each SU q:
aqr =

1, if r ∈ Nq
0, if r /∈ Nq
F − deginq if r = q,
(56)
where F is any integer number. Associated with the SUs’ network topology, there are some absolute
quantities that play a role in the stopping criterion of the iterates (55) and the computation of the final
consensus value. More specifically, for each node q, there exist a scalar 0 ≤ Lq ≤ Q− degq and a (Lq +1)-
length vector mq ∈ RLq+1 having the following properties [47]: given the samples z(0)q , . . . , z(Lq)q collected
by the SU q in the first Lq + 1 iterations of (55), it holds that
mTq

z
(0)
q
...
z
(Lq)
q
 = 1Q
Q∑
r=1
z(0)r =
1
Q
Q∑
r=1
τ̂
(n)
r√
fr
. (57)
According to (57), each SU q can obtain locally the desired average of the sensing times after running the
linear iterates (55) for Lq +1 time-steps; this will require at most Q−degq+1 time-iterations. Note that,
to calculate the quantity in (57), the SUs do not need to store the entire set of samples z
(0)
q , . . . , z
(Lq)
q ;
instead one can compute the scalar product in (57) incrementally, as the iterations progress.
To implement the above protocol distributively, each SU q has to preliminarily estimate his own Lq
and mq; for time-invariant topologies this can be done just once; the cost of this computation will then be
amortized over the number of times the consensus algorithm is performed. In [47], the authors proposed
a decentralized protocol still based on the updating (55) to perform such a computation in (at most)
Q(Q − 1) iterations; we refer the interested reader to [47, Sec. V] for details. The consensus protocol
discussed above is formally described in Algorithm 2 below, which represents the subroutine to implement
Step 2 of Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 2: Finite-time Consensus Algorithm in Step 2 of Algorithm 1
Data : τ̂
(n)
q [from Step 2 of Algorithm 1], Lq, mq, and (aqr)
Q
r=1, for all q = 1, . . . , Q.
(S.2a) : Set z
(0)
q = τ̂
(n)
q , for q = 1, . . . , Q and set i = 0.
(S.2b) : for i = 1, . . . ,maxq Lq,
− Each SU q updates z(i)q according to (55)
− if i == Lq for some q, then SU q computes (57) and gets 1
Q
Q∑
r=1
τ̂
(n)
r√
fr
;
end (for).
In Algorithm 2, the number of iterations i required to propagate the consensus over the whole network
is maxq{Lq} + 1 ≤ Q −minq{degq} + 1. One can reduce such a number by slightly changing the above
25
protocol: SU q runs the iteration (55) for Lq +1 consecutive time-steps, or until he receives the consensus
value from a neighbor. If Lq + 1 iterations passes without receiving the consensus value, SU q calculates
that value and broadcast it to his neighbors, along with a flag indicating that it is the consensus value
(and not just an intermediate value). In this way, “slower” SUs r’s will receive the final value at most one
iteration after node q.
On the time-complexity and communication costs
We quantify now the complexity of Algorithm 1 (whose Step 2 is implemented using Algorithm 2) in terms
of the minimum number of iterations required to reach the desired convergence accuracy and communica-
tion costs (number of message passing among the SUs). Both results come readily from the following two
facts.
Fact 1. The convergence conditions of Algorithm 1 as given in Theorem 16 in Appendix E are based on
the contraction properties of the best-response mapping Bπt(x) ,
(
x⋆q(x−q, πt)
)Q
q=1
associated with the
game Gπ(X , θ) in (48), with each x⋆q(x−q, πt) defined in (34): under assumptions in Theorem 16, there
exists a constant cB ∈ (0, 1) such that [see (139) in Appendix E]
‖Bπt(x)− Bπt(y)‖ ≤ cB ‖x− y‖ , ∀x,y ∈ X , (58)
where an explicit expression of the contraction constant cB is given in (139) (cf. Appendix E.1). If the
“suitable termination criterion” in Step 2 of Algorithm 1 is chosen as the smallest iteration n = nmin at
which the relative error
∥∥Bπt(x(n))− x⋆∥∥ /∥∥x(0) − x⋆∥∥ is less than a prescribed tolerance ǫmax > 0 [with
x⋆ being the NE of Gπ(X , θ)], (58) leads to
nmin ≥ ln (1/ǫmax)
ln |cB| , (59)
which provides the number of iterations n required for Algorithm 1 to reach convergence (within the
accuracy ǫmax).
Fact 2. The consensus algorithm described in Algorithm 2 was shown to converge in at most maxq{Lq}+
1 ≤ Q−minq{degq}+1 iterations. The communication cost incurred by the protocol can be characterized
as follows. Given the directed graph modeling the network topology (the outgoing edges from each node q
link the nodes associated with the SUs who receive interference from SU q), each SU q transmits a scalar
value on each outgoing edge at each time-step i; since there are at most maxq{Lq} runs, each SU q will
have in principle to transmit (maxq{Lq} + 1) · degoutq messages, where degoutq is the out-degree of node
q (i.e., the number of SUs having user q as interferer). Thanks to the broadcast nature of the wireless
channel, however, a single transmission of each user q will be equivalent to communicating a message along
each of degoutq outgoing edges, and thus each node would only have to transmit maxq{Lq} + 1 messages.
Summing over all nodes in the network, there will be
∑Q
q=1(maxq{Lq}+ 1) overall messages that have to
be transmitted to run the consensus protocol.
Using Facts 1 and 2 above, one can conclude that Algorithm 1 (whose Step 2 is implemented by
Algorithm 2) converges (within the accuracy ǫmax) in
ln (1/ǫmax)
ln |cB| · (maxq{Lq}+1) (outer plus inner-loop)
iterations, which is also the number of per/user message passing.
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A special case: fixed equi-sensing times
In the scenarios where no coordination is allowed among the SUs to run a consensus algorithm, one can
implement a special case of Algorithm 1, where the SUs’ sensing times are fixed a-priori and thus not
optimized. This would correspond to solving the game Gπ(X , θ) in (48) where the sensing times τ̂q are
fixed and equal to a common value τ ; the resulting solution scheme will be like Algorithm 1 where there is
no Step 2 and the optimization problems in (48) are solved only with respect to the tuple (pq, P
fa
q ), given
τ̂q = τ . The time and communication complexity of such an algorithm is of the same order of that required
by the well-known iterative waterfilling algorithm proposed and studied in many papers [18, 19, 20, 24]
to distributively solve the rate maximization game over interference channels (there is no optimization of
the sensing part in any formulation of that game). The price in the reduction of signaling obtained with
the fixing of sensing times may be paid in terms of overall performance; in Sec. 6, we numerically quantify
the loss in using a fixed sensing time rather than optimizing it. This sheds some light on the trade-off
between performance and signaling in the proposed games.
On the best-response computation
A last comment deals with the computation of the best-response of each optimization problem (48), which
would require the capability of solving a nonconvex problems. This is not a difficult task under the
assumption of Theorem 16 (cf. Appendix E), which ensures that each of such (nonconvex) optimization
problems has a unique stationary point (cf. Proposition 2) that can be computed by any of nonlinear
programming solvers, provided that each SU q has the information on the strategies x−q of the other SUs.
Finally, observe that, when conditions in Theorem 16 are not satisfied, every limit point of the sequence
generated by the proposed algorithms, wherein the best-response solution is replaced by a stationary
solution, has still some optimality properties: it is guaranteed to be a QNE of the game, whose properties
have been studied in our companion paper [26].
5.2 Game with endogenous prices
We focus now on distributed algorithms for solving the general game G(X , θ). The main challenge here is
to obtain distributed algorithms in the presence of coupling nonconvex constraints. The proposed approach
is to reduce the solution of the nonconvex game G(X , θ) with side constraints to a solution of a sequence
of (compact and) convex 3 games of a particular structure with no side constraints. The advantage of
this method is that we can efficiently solve each of the convex games with convergence guarantee using
the best-response algorithms introduced in Sec. 5.1 for the game Gπ(X , θ) with exogenous price; the
disadvantage is that, to recover the solution of the original game G(X , θ), we have to solve a (possibly
infinite) number of convex games. However, it is important to remark from the outset that this potential
drawback is greatly mitigated by the fact that, as we discuss shortly, (i) one only needs to solve these
3According to the terminology introduced in [27], a game is said to be compact and convex if: i) the feasible set of each
player is a convex and compact set; and ii) the cost function of each player (to be minimized) is a convex and continuously
differentiable function of the strategy of that player, for any given strategy profile of the other players. The desired properties
of such games are: i) each player optimization problem is a convex problem and thus it can be solved using efficient numerical
algorithms; and i) they always have a NE.
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games inaccurately; (ii) the (inaccurate) solution of the NEPs usually requires little computational effort;
and (iii) in practice, a fairly accurate solution of the original game G(X , θ) is obtained after the solution
of a limited number of games in the sequence.
Before introducing the formal description of the algorithm, let us begin with some informal observations
and intermediate results motivating how the sequence of convex games is built; the mathematical details
can be found in Appendix F. At the basis of our analysis there are two results, namely: i) an equivalence
(under some conditions) between the game G(X , θ) and the VI(Zt, Ψ) introduced in (45); and ii) the
reformulation of the VI(Zt, Ψ) as a convex game with no side constraint. The former connection, which is
made formal in Lemma 7 below, allows us to remove side constraints from the game G(X , θ), whereas the
latter, given in Lemma 8 below, paves the way to the use of best-response algorithms for convex games
with no side constraints, as introduced in Sec. 5.1.
Lemma 7. Given the game G(X , θ), suppose that there exists some t > λmax such that the matrix
A(x, λ, πt) in (46) is positive definite for all x ∈ Y, λ ∈ [0, λmax]Q, and πt ∈ St. Then G(X , θ) is
equivalent to the VI(Zt, Ψ), which always has a solution. The equivalence is in the following sense: for
any solution
(
xVI, λVI, πVIt
) ∈ Zt of the VI, the tuple (xVI, πVIt ) is a NE of G(X , θ); conversely, the game
G(X , θ) has a NE (x⋆, π⋆t ), and for any such a NE there exist multipliers λ⋆ ∈ [0, λmax]Q associated with
the nonconvex constraints {Iq(x⋆q), q = 1, . . . , Q} such that (x⋆, λ⋆, π⋆t ) is a solution of the VI(Zt, Ψ).
Sufficient conditions for A(x, λ, πt) to be positive definite along with their physical interpretation
are given in Sec. 4.3 (cf. Corollary 6). Under conditions of Lemma 7, one can solve the VI(Zt, Ψ) and
obtain the NE of the original game G(X , θ). Since we are interested in using best-response algorithms as
those developed in Sec. 5.1 for games with exogenous price and no side constraints, we rewrite next the
VI(Zt, Ψ) as a game, and then use best-response algorithms to solve that game. More formally, let us
introduce the following game with no side constraints wherein the players, anticipating rivals’ strategies,
solve
(i) : minimize
xq∈Yq
Lq ((xq, λq), x−q, πt) , q = 1, . . . , Q
(ii) : minimize
λq∈[0, λmax]
−λq · Iq(xq), q = 1, . . . , Q,
(iii) : minimize
πt∈St
−πt · I(x).
(60)
The following connection holds between the above game and the VI(Zt, Ψ).
Lemma 8. Under the setting of Lemma 7, the VI(Zt, Ψ) is equivalent to the game in (60), which always
admits a NE.
Note that the game in (60) is composed of 2Q+1 players. The first Q players in (i) correspond to the
players of the original game G(X , θ)−the SUs in the system−that now optimize a different cost function,
which is the “Lagrangian” function associated with their original cost functions in (23), for a given set
of price πt and multiplies λ. In addition to the Q SUs, there are Q + 1 more players solving problems
(ii) and (iii); they act as virtual players who aim to compute the optimal multipliers λq’s associated with
the nonconvex local interference constraints {Iq(xq), q = 1, . . . , Q} and the optimal price πt, respectively.
By introducing these virtual players, the original game G(X , θ) can be transformed (under the setting of
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Lemma 7) into the desired (compact and) convex game with only local constraints, which paves the way
to the design of best-response algorithms for the game G(X , θ).
We proved in Appendix E that the best-response algorithms introduced in Sec. 5.1 converge under
conditions implying the uniqueness of individual player’s optimization problems. The game in the form
(60) however may never satisfy such conditions; indeed, the linear programming problems in (ii) and (iii)
have multiple optimal solutions whenever some Iq(xq) = 0 or I(x) = 0. To overcome this issue, we follow
a similar idea as in Step 1 of Sec. 4.2 and introduce in (ii) and (iii) of (60) a proximal-based regularization
of the λ-variables and price πt, so that the resulting modified optimization problems become strongly
convex. Given the center of the regularization of the λ-variables, say λ0 , (λ0q)
Q
q=1, and the price πt, say
π0t , and the proximal gain α > 0, the regularized version of the game in (60), denoted by Gt(X ,θ,λ0, π0t )
is the following.
Game Gt(X ,θ,λ0, π0t ). Anticipating rivals’ strategies and given λ0 , (λ0q)Qq=1, π0t , and α > 0, the
2Q+ 1 players solve the following optimization problems:
minimize
xq∈Yq
Lq ((xq, λq), x−q, πt) , q = 1, . . . , Q
minimize
λq∈[0, λmax]
−λq · Iq(xq) + α
2
(
λq − λ0q
)2
, q = 1, . . . , Q,
minimize
πt∈St
−πt · I(x) + α
2
(
πt − π0t
)2
(61)
The main (desired) property of game Gt(X ,θ,λ0, π0t ) is that, under the setting of Lemma 7, the NE
is unique and it can be computed with convergence guarantee using best-response algorithms as those
introduced in Sec. 5.1 (we make formal this statement shortly). Nice as it is, this result would be of no
practical interest if we were not able to connect the solutions of Gt(X ,θ,λ0, π0t ) with those of the game in
(60) and thus the original game G(X , θ). In fact, the solution of Gt(X ,θ,λ0, π0t ) and (60) are in general
different but, nevertheless, there exists a connection between them, as stated in the following lemma.
Lemma 9. Under the setting of Lemma 7, a tuple (x⋆,λ⋆, π⋆t ) is a NE of the game in (60) if and only if
it is a NE of the game Gt(X ,θ,λ⋆, π⋆t ). Therefore, such a (x⋆, π⋆t ) is a NE of the original game G(X ,θ).
Providing the relationship between G(X ,θ), the game in (60), and Gt(X ,θ,λ0, π0t ), Lemma 9 opens
the way to the design of best-response algorithms that solve the original game G(X ,θ): instead of solving
G(X ,θ) directly, starting from an arbitrary regularization tuple (λ0, π0t ) > 0, one can solve the sequence
of games Gt(X ,θ,λ0, π0t )→ · · · → Gt(X ,θ,λn, πnt )→ · · · , where the center (λn, πnt ) of the regularization
of the game at stage n is just the (λ, πt)-component of the (unique) NE of the game Gt(X ,θ,λn−1, πn−1t )
in the previous stage. If this procedure converges, it must converge to a tuple (x⋆,λ⋆, π⋆t ) that necessarily
is a NE of the game Gt(X ,θ,λ⋆, π⋆t ), which implies by Lemma 9 that (x⋆,λ⋆) is also a NE of the original
game G(X ,θ). A flow-chart with the connection of all these games along with an informal description of
the above ideas is given in Figure 1.
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A (x,λ,pi) ≻ 0
[Lemma 7]
Augmented game in (60)
(x,λ, pit) = game variables
x = player’s strategy profile
(λ, pit) = virtual players’ strategies
(x⋆,λ⋆, pi⋆
t
) = NE
Game G(X ,θ)
(x, pi) = game variables
x = players’ strategy profile
pi = price variable associated with
the side constraint I(x) ≤ 0
(x⋆, pi⋆) = NE
VI(Zt, Ψ) [t > λ
max]
(x,λ, pi) = VI variables
x = primal variable
λ = dual variables of {Iq(xq) ≤ 0, q = 1, . . . , Q}
pi = dual variable of I(x) ≤ 0
(xVI,λVI, piVI) = VI solution
(x⋆,pi⋆) = (xVI,piVI)
A
(x
,λ
,pi
)
≻
0
[L
em
m
a
8]
(xVI,λVI, piVI) = (x⋆,λ⋆, pi⋆
t
)
A (x,λ,pi) ≻ 0
[Theorem 10]
Solve the sequence of games Gt(X ,θ,λ
n,pint )
Gt(X ,θ,λ
0,pi0t ) → · · ·
n→∞
→ Gt(X ,θ,λ
∞,pi∞t )
(x⋆,∞,λ⋆,∞,pi⋆,∞t ) = NE of Gt(X ,θ,λ
∞,pi∞t )
(x⋆,∞,λ⋆,∞,pi⋆,∞t ) = (x
⋆,λ⋆,pi⋆t )
(a) (b)
(c)(d)
Figure 1: Connection among G(X ,θ), VI(Zt,Ψ) , and the sequence of games Gt(X ,θ,λn, pint ). Under the setting of Lemma
7, we have the following: i) G(X ,θ) in (a) is equivalent to the “augmented” VI(Zt,Ψ) in (b), where the local interference
constraints {Iq(xq), q = 1, . . . , Q} are “relaxed” by introducing the multipliers λ , (λq)
Q
q=1 and pi is a variable of the VI; ii) the
VI(Zt,Ψ) can be interpreted as a (compact) convex “augmented” game with no side constraints as represented in (c) [see (60)],
where there areQ real players, the SUs, andQ+1 virtual players who aim to optimize the multipliers λq’s and the price variable
pit; iii) a NE of the augmented game (60), and thus the original game G(X ,θ), is computed via best-response algorithms
solving the sequence of regularized convex games with no side constraints Gt(X ,θ,λ
0, pi0t ) → · · · → Gt(X ,θ,λ
∞, pi∞t ) as
shown in (d).
A formal description of the above solution method is given in Algorithm 3 below, which provides the de-
sired best-response based scheme solving the game G(X ,θ); the convergence conditions are given in Theo-
rem 10. In the algorithm we use the following notation: given (λn, πnt ), we denote by (x
⋆(λn, πnt ),λ
⋆(λn, πnt ),
π⋆t (λ
n, πnt )) the NE tuple of the game Gt(X ,θ,λn, πnt ), where we make explicit the dependence on the reg-
ularization offset (λn, πnt ).
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Algorithm 3: Best-Response Algorithm for G(X ,θ)
(S.0) : Choose any tuple
(
λ0, π0t
)
> 0, with λ0 , (λ0q)
Q
q=1, and some ǫ ∈ (0, 1); set n = 0.
(S.1) : If (x⋆(λn, πnt ), λ
⋆(λn, πnt ), π
⋆
t (λ
n, πnt )) satisfies a suitable termination criterion: STOP.
(S.2) : Solve the game Gt(X ,θ,λn, πnt ); let (x⋆(λn, πnt ), λ⋆(λn, πnt ), π⋆t (λn, πnt )) be the NE.
(S.3) : Update the center of the regularization:
λn+1q , (1− ǫ) · λnq + ǫ · λ⋆q(λn, πnt ), q = 1, . . . , Q,
πn+1t , (1− ǫ) · πnt + ǫ · π⋆t (λn, πnt ).
(62)
.
(S.4) : n← n+ 1; go to (S.1).
Theorem 10. Under the setting of Lemma 7, the sequence {(x⋆(λn, πnt ), π⋆t (λn, πnt ))}∞n=0 generated by
Algorithm 3 globally converges to a NE of G(X ,θ).
Proof. See Appendix F.
It is interesting to observe that Algorithm 3 converges under the same conditions introduced in Propo-
sition 5 and guaranteeing the uniqueness of the x-component of the NE of G(X ,θ); we refer to Corollary
6 and Sec. 4.3 for easier conditions to be checked as well as a detailed discussion on their interpreta-
tion in terms of the system parameters. We discuss next some practical implementation issues related to
Algorithm 3.
5.2.1 Discussion on the implementation
Algorithm 3 is conceptually a double-loop scheme wherein at each (outer) iteration n, given the current
values of the regularization parameters (λn, πnt ), the SUs solve the game Gt(X ,θ,λn, πnt ) (with t > λmax)
[Step 2], which requires an inner iterative process. Once the NE of Gt(X ,θ,λn, πnt ) is reached, the reg-
ularization parameters (λn, πnt ) are updated according to (62) [Step 3], which represents the outer loop,
and the new game Gt(X ,θ,λn+1, πn+1t ) is played again (if the convergence criterion in Step 1 is not met).
In practice, however, Algorithm 3 is implementable as a single-loop scheme: the SUs play the game
Gt(X ,θ,λn, πnt ), wherein from “time to time” (more precisely, when a NE is reached within the required
accuracy) the objective functions of the virtual players are changed by updating the regularization terms
from α2 (λq − λnq ) and α2 (πt − πnt ) to α2 (λq − λn+1q ) and α2 (πt − πn+1t ), respectively.
In order to implement the aforementioned single-scale scheme, the following issues need to be addressed:
1) How to solve each inner game Gt(X ,θ,λn, πnt ) via distributed best-response algorithms? 2) How to
update the regularization parameters in a distributed way? and 3) How to check the terminations of
the inner process in Step 2−the SUs have reached a NE of the game Gt(X ,θ,λn, πnt ) within the desired
accuracy? We provide an answer to these questions next.
On the inner game and price/multipliers update [Steps 2 and 3]
Capitalizing on the solution methods that we developed in Sec. 5.1 for games with exogenous price and
no side constraints, a natural choice for computing a NE of each Gt(X ,θ,λn, πnt ) in Step 2 of Algorithm
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3 is applying those best-response asynchronous algorithms to Gt(X ,θ,λn, πnt ). For instance, if a Jacobi
scheme is chosen (cf. Algorithm 1), Algorithm 3 reduces to Algorithm 4 below, which sheds light on the
signaling and complexity requirements of the proposed class of algorithms. In Algorithm 4 we use the
following notation:
(
x⋆(λ, πt), λ
⋆(λ, πt), π
⋆
t (λ, πt)
)
denotes the NE of Gt(X ,θ,λ, πt), and [x]λmax0 in (63)
is the Euclidean projection onto the interval [0, λmax], i.e., [x]λ
max
0 , max(0,min(x, λ
max)).
Algorithm 4: Jacobi Best-Response-Consensus Algorithm for G(X ,θ)
(S.0) : Choose i) any arbitrary starting point (x(0),λ(0), π
(0)
t ), with x
(0) , (τ̂
(0)
q ,p
(0)
q , P
fa(0)
q ) ∈
Y and (λ(0), π(0)t ) > 0; ii) any regularization tuple
(
λ, πt
)
> 0 , and iii) some ǫ ∈ (0, 1); set
n = 0.
(S.1): If
(
x⋆(λ, πt), λ
⋆(λ, πt), π
⋆
t (λ, πt)
)
satisfies a suitable termination criterion: STOP.
(S.2a): Run a (vector) consensus algorithm to locally compute the current values of
1
Q
Q∑
q=1
τ̂
(n)
q√
fq
and I
(
x(n)
)
=
Q∑
q=1
Iq(x
(n)
q ) [cf. Algorithm 2];
(S.2b): Update the players’ strategies simultaneously:
x
(n+1)
q ∈ argmin
xq∈Yq
{
Lq
(
(xq, λ
(n)
q ), x
(n)
−q , π
n
t
)}
, ∀q = 1, . . . , Q
λ
(n+1)
q =
λq + Iq
(
x
(n)
q
)
α
λ
max
0
, ∀q = 1, . . . , Q
π
(n+1)
t =
[
πt +
I
(
x(n)
)
α
]λmax
0
.
(63)
(S.3) : If
(
x(n+1), λ(n+1), π
(n+1)
t
)
is a NE of Gt(X ,θ,λ, πt), then
1) update the regularization tuple
(
λ, πt
)
:
λq = λ
(n+1)
q , ∀q = 1, . . . , Q and πt = π(n+1)t ; (64)
2) set
(
x⋆(λ, πt), λ
⋆(λ, πt), π
⋆
t (λ, πt)
)
=
(
x(n+1), λ(n+1), π
(n+1)
t
)
;
3) n← n+ 1 and return to (S.1).
else: n← n+ 1 and return to (S.2a).
The convergence analysis of the algorithm follows from that of Algorithm 3 (the outer loop) and
Algorithm 1 (the inner loop) and thus is omitted. It is worth mentionig that Algorithm 4 converges
under similar conditions obtained for Algorithm 1, provided that a sufficiently large proximal gain α is
chosen; this is not surprising, since the core of Algorithm 4 is the updating rule used in Algorithm 1,
whose convergence conditions imply those of the outer loop (cf. Theorem 10). We refer to Sec. 5.1 for an
interpretation of these convergence conditions.
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Algorithm 4 is mainly composed of two-subroutines: a consensus-based scheme [Step 2a] and a best-
response update [Step 2b], both implemented locally by the SUs. More specifically, the inner game
Gt(X ,θ,λ, πt) is solved in a fairly distributed way by following a two-steps procedure. Fist, in Step
2a, the SUs run a consensus algorithm to locally acquire the global information required to perform the
update of their sensing/transmission variables as well as the multipliers λq’s and the price πt, which
is represented by the average sensing time (1/Q)
∑Q
q=1 (τ̂
(n)
q /
√
fq) and the global level of interference
I(x(n)) =
∑Q
q=1 Iq(x
(n)
q ) generated at the primary receiver; this procedure requires an exchange of infor-
mation among neighboring nodes, as already discussed in Sec. 5.1, where we refer for details. Once the
aforementioned information is available at the secondary transmitters, each SU q locally updates his own
sensing/transmission strategy xq as well as the multiplier λq and the price πt, according to (63) [Step2b];
he just needs to measure the MUI experienced at his receiver and solve his own optimization problem.
Note that: i) the updates of the multipliers λq’s and the price πt have an explicit closed form expres-
sion, and thus are computationally inexpensive; and ii) there is no need of a centralized authority for the
optimization of the price πt, which is instead updated locally by each SU.
On the inner termination criterium [Step 2]
The only issue left to discuss is how to check the termination criterion of the inner process in Step 2
of Algorithm 3; similar discussion applies to Algorithm 4. In practice, Step 2 is terminated when the
NE (x⋆(λn, πnt ), λ
⋆(λn, πnt ), π
⋆
t (λ
n, πnt )) of Gt(X ,θ,λn, πnt ) is reached within the prescribed accuracy,4
say ε(n), where we let ε(n) to depend on the (outer) iteration index n. Stated in mathematical terms,
this means that the players leave Step 2 as soon as their current strategy profile (x, λ, πt) satisfies the
following inequality: ∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
 xλ
πt
−
 x
⋆(λn, πnt )
λ⋆(λn, πnt )
π⋆t (λ
n, πnt )

∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
≤ ε(n), (65)
where ‖•‖ is any vector norm. Denoting by z , (x, λ, πt) the players’ strategy profile and by SGt(λn, πnt )
the (unique) NE of Gt(X ,θ,λn, πnt ), which depends on the regularization parameters (λn, πnt ), the stop-
ping criterium in (65) can be equivalently written as ‖z − SGt(λn, πnt )‖2 ≤ ε(n). Using the above nota-
tion/terminology, Step 2 of Algorithm 3 reads as
(S.2a) : Solve the game Gt(X ,θ,λn, πnt ) within the accuracy ε(n): find a z = (x, λ, πt) such that
‖z− SGt(λn, πnt )‖2 ≤ ε(n); (66)
(S.2b) : Set (x⋆(λn, πnt ), λ
⋆(λn, πnt ), π
⋆
t (λ
n, πnt )) = z.
In general, the test in (66) would require some coordination among the players; nevertheless, we suggest
next two simple distributed protocols to do that, building on the error-bound analysis of VIs [35, Ch. 6].
Observe preliminarily that an error bound on the distance of the current strategy profile z from the
NE SGt(λ
n, πnt ) can be obtained by solving a convex (quadratic) problem (see, e.g., [35, Prop. 6.3.1], [35,
Prop. 6.3.7]). Indeed, under the convergence conditions of Algorithm 3 [cf. Theorem 10], one can write
4Recall that, under the convergence conditions in Theorem 10, each Gt(X ,θ,λ, pit) has a unique equilibrium,
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each game Gt(X ,θ,λn, πnt ) as a (strongly monotone) VI problem, for which the following error bound
holds [35, Prop. 6.3.1]: a (finite and absolute) constant η > 05 exists such that for every z,
‖z− SGt(λn, πnt )‖2 ≤ η ‖Ψnnat (z) ‖2, (67)
with
Ψnnat (z) ,

 xq −ΠYq
(
xq −∇xqLq((xq, λq), x−q, πt)
)
λq −
[
λnq +
Iq(xq)
α
]λmax
0

Q
q=1
πt −
[
πnt +
I(x)
α
]λmax
0

,

(
[Ψnnat (z)]q
)Q
q=1
[Ψnnat (z)]Q+1
 , (68)
and ΠYq (a) denoting the Euclidean projection of the vector a onto the closed and convex set Yq, where
in (68) we made explicit the partition of Ψnnat (z) in Q + 1 (vector) components, ([Ψ
n
nat (z)]q)
Q+1
q=1 , each
of the first Q being associated with one different player q. The important result here is that each SU q
can compute his own component [Ψnnat (z)]q (as well as the last component [Ψ
n
nat (z)]Q+1) efficiently and
locally. Indeed, capitalizing on the information already acquired for the computation of the best-response,
he just needs to solve a quadratic programming [corresponding to the evaluation of the projection ΠYq (•)],
for which no extra signaling/coordination with the others is required.
A simple application of the error bound (67) for the test in (66) is to let each SU q to choose a
local termination error εq ≤ η · ε/Q, with ε = ε(n) being the desired accuracy in (67), and perform the
termination criterion ‖[Ψnnat (z)]q‖2 + ‖[Ψnnat (z)]Q+1‖2 ≤ εq; which is locally implementable, provided
that an estimate of the absolute constant η in (67) and the number of the active SUs can be preliminary
obtained.
When this information is not available, one can consider a variation (inexact version) of Algorithm
3. Instead of solving each game Gt(X ,θ,λn, πnt ) exactly, the players compute at every stage n only an
approximated solution of Gt(X ,θ,λn, πnt ) that becomes tighter and tighter as the iteration in n proceeds.
Stated in mathematical terms, we have that the sub-iterations in Step 2a are terminated according to a
prescribed error sequence {ε(n)}n that progressively becomes tighter as the iteration in n proceeds. For
instance, a suitable termination sequence in (66) is any {ε(n)}n ⊂ [0,∞) satisfying
∑∞
n=1 ε
(n) <∞; since
the latter condition implies ε(n) ↓ 0, when the iterations n progress the NE SGt(λn, πnt ) will be estimated
with an increasing accuracy. One can show that the aforementioned inexact version of Algorithm 3
converges under the same conditions given in Theorem 10; we omit the details because of the space
limitation, and we refer to [22] for a similar approach valid for convex games. The termination protocol
for the inexact version of Algorithm 3 is then the following. Each player q choses preliminarily a suitable
local termination sequence {ε(n)q }n ⊂ [0,∞) such that
∑∞
n=1 ε
(n)
q < ∞; the termination criterion of each
player q becomes then ‖[Ψnnat (z)]q‖2 + ‖[Ψnnat (z)]Q+1‖2 ≤ ε(n)q , which can be locally implemented. Once
the desired local accuracy is reached by all the players, they can all update the center of their regularization,
according to (62). This protocol guarantees that the resulting sequence ε(n) ,
∑Q
q=1 ε
(n)
q in (66) will satisfy
the required condition
∑∞
n=1 ε
(n) <∞, without the need of any information exchange among the players.
5An explicit expression of η can be obtained as a function of the system parameters, based on [35, Prop. 6.3.1].
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The last issue to address for a practical implementation of the two protocols above is to understand
how the players can know that also the others have reached the desired termination criterion. This can
be done by exchanging one bit of information; otherwise each user can just update his regularization after
experiencing no changes in ‖[Ψnnat (z)]q‖ and ‖[Ψnnat (z)]Q+1‖ for a prescribed number of iterations.
Two last comments about the proposed class of algorithms solving G(X ,θ) are in order. To obtain
decentralize algorithms even in the presence of global (nonconvex) interference constraints, we have intro-
duced multipliers and relaxed the global constraints. As a side effect of the proposed approach, we have
that global interference constraints are met only at the equilibrium of the game; implying that during
the iterations of the algorithms they might not be satisfied. This issue is alleviated in practice by a fast
convergent behavior of the proposed algorithms, as shown in Sec. 6. Note that this issue is quite common
to many power control algorithms subject to QoS or coupling interference constraints (see, e.g., [48] and
references therein). Finally, we wish to point out that when the sufficient conditions for the convergence
of the proposed algorithms are not satisfied, still we can claim some optimality property for the proposed
algorithms, namely: every limit point of the sequence generated by the our algorithms is a quasi-NE of the
game under consideration; the analysis of such relaxed equilibrium concept along with its main properties
is addressed in the companion paper [26].
5.3 A bird’s-eye view
In the previous three sections we proposed several distributed algorithms to solve the general game G(X ,θ)
and its special cases. The algorithms differ from computational complexity, performance, and level of
signaling among the SUs; making them applicable to several different scenarios. It is useful to summarize
the results obtained so far, showing that, in spite of apparent diversities, all the algorithms belong to a
same family; Figure 2 provides the roadmap of the proposed distributed solution methods along with the
signaling required for their implementation.
6 Numerical Results
In this section, we provide some numerical results to illustrate our theoretical findings. More specifically, we
first compare the performance of our games with those of state-of-the-art decentralized [21] and centralized
[14] schemes proposed in the literature for similar problems; such schemes do not perform any sensing
optimization using thus all the frame length for the transmission, and the QoS of the PUs is preserved by
imposing (deterministic) interference constraints (we properly modified the algorithms in [14] to include the
interference constraints in the feasible set of the optimization problem). Interestingly, the proposed design
of CR systems based on the distributed joint optimization of the sensing and transmission strategies
is shown to outperform both centralized and decentralized current CR designs, which validates our new
formulation. Then, we provide an example of signaling/performance trade-off, showing the throughput
gains achievable by the SUs if the sensing time is included in the optimization. Finally, we focus on the
convergence properties of the proposed algorithms.
Example #1: Comparison with state-of-the-art algorithms. In Fig. 3, we compare the perfor-
mance achievable by the proposed joint optimization of the sensing and the transmission strategies with
those achievable using the sum-rate NUM-based approach subject to interference constraints [14] and the
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t
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using Algorithms 3 (or Algorithm 4)
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form of consensus (Algorithm 2)
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Game G(X ,θ) [cf. (23)-(24)]
Game Gpi=0(X ,θ) [cf. (48)]
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- asynchronous implementation
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YES
global
interference
constraints?
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Game Gpi(X ,θ) [cf. (48)]
- only local interference constraints
- optimization of the sensing times
Solve Gpi(X ,θ) using Algorithm 1
- asynchronous implementation
- signalling among the players in the
form of consensus (Algorithm 2)
NO
Figure 2: Road-map of the proposed algorithms solving G(X ,θ) and its special cases along with the resulting sig-
nalling/optimization tradeoff.
game theoretical formulation in [21]. More specifically, we plot the (%) ratio (SRQE − SR)/SR versus
the (normalized) interference constraint bound P/Imax (Pq = Pr = P for all q 6= r and Imaxq = Imax for
all q), for different values of the SNR detection snrd = σ
2
Iq,k
/σ2q,k, where SRQE is the sum-throughput
achievable at the (Q)NE of the game Gπ=0(X ,θ) (local interference constraints only), whereas SR is either
the sum-rate achievable using the scheme in [14] (red line curves) or the sum-rate at the NE of the game in
[21] (black line curves). We simulated a hierarchical CR network composed of two PUs (the base stations
of two cells) and ten SUs, randomly distributed in the cells. The (cross-)channels among the secondary
links and between the primary and the secondary links are FIR filters of order L = 10, where each tap
has variance equal to 1/L2; the available bandwidth is divided in N = 1024 subchannels. From Fig. 3,
we clearly see that the proposed joint optimization of the sensing and transmission parameters yields a
considerable performance improvement over the current state-of-the-art CR centralized and decentralized
designs, especially when the interference constraints are stringent.
Example #2: Sensing time optimization. Fig. 4 shows an example of the achievable throughput of
the SUs when the sensing time is included in the optimization. More specifically, in the picture, we plot
the (normalized) sum-throughput achieved at a (Q)NE by one player of the game versus the (normalized)
common sensing time, for different values of the (normalized) total interference constraint (the setup is
the same as in Fig. 3). In the same figure, we plot also the sum-throughput achieved at the (Q)NE of the
game Gπ=0(X ,θ) (square markers in the plot), where c is set to c = 100. According to the picture, the
following comments are in order. There exists an optimal duration for the (common) sensing time at which
the throughput of each SU is maximized, implying that the SUs can achieve better performance if some
(limited) signaling is exchanged in order to optimize also the sensing time. Second, as expected, more
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stringent interference constraints impose lower missed detection probabilities as well as false-alarm rates;
requirement that is met by increasing the sensing time (i.e., making the detection more accurate). This is
clear in the picture where one can see that the optimal sensing time duration increases as the interference
constraints increase. Third, the proposed approach based on a penalty function leads to performance
comparable with those achievable by a centralized approach that computes the optimal common sensing
time based on a grid search.
Example #3: Algorithms for Gπ=0(X ,θ) (local constraints only). In Fig. 5, we plot an instance of
the sequential and simultaneous best-response based algorithms, proposed in Sec. 5.1 to solve the game
Gπ(X ,θ) in (48), with π = 0 (cf. Algorithm 1). We considered the same setup as in Fig. 4, but with
15 active SUs; the SNR detection snrd , σ
2
Iq,k
/σ2q,k is set to snrd = 0dB, for all q and k; the SNR of
the SUs snrq,k , Pq/σ
2
q (k) is snrq,k = 2dB for all q and k, and the (normalized) inter-pair distances
dqr/dqq ≥ 3 for all q 6= r, with dqr denoting the distance between the receiver of SU q and the transmitter
of SU r, which corresponds to a “low/medium” level of interference among the SUs; the bounds αq,k and
βq,k are both equal to 0.5 for all q and k; and the constant c is set to c = 100. In Fig. 5(a), we plot the
opportunistic throughput evolution of the SUs’ links as a function of the iteration index, achieved using
the sequential best-response algorithm (solid line curves) and the simultaneous best-response algorithm
(dashed line curves); whereas in Fig. 5(b) we plot the evolution of the optimal (normalized) sensing times
of the SUs versus the iteration index. To make the figures not excessively overcrowded, we report only
the curves of 3 out of 15 links. As expected, the sequential best-response algorithm is slower than the
simultaneous version, especially if the number of active links is large, since each SU is forced to wait for
all the users scheduled in advance, before updating his own strategy. However, both algorithms converge
in a few iterations (this desired feature has been observed for different channel realizations), which makes
them appealing in practical CR scenarios. Observe also that, thanks to the penalty term on the sensing
times in the objective function of each SU, the algorithms converge to the same optimal sensing time for
all the SUs [cf. Fig. 5(b)]. Roughly speaking, these algorithms share the same features of the well-known
iterative waterfilling algorithms solving the power control game over ICs [18, 19, 20, 21, 22].
Finally, observe that, even when the theoretical convergence conditions we obtained are not satisfied,
still we can claim that every limit point of the sequence generated by our algorithms is a QNE of the
game.
Example #4: Algorithms for G(X ,θ) (global constraints). In Fig. 6 we tested the convergence
speed of Algorithm 1 applied to the game G(X ,θ) in the presence of global interference constraints. The
system setup is the same as the one considered in Fig. 5 for the low/medium interference regime, with
the only difference that now, instead of the overall bandwidth interference constraints (7), we assume that
the PUs impose the global interference constraint (8); for the sake of simplicity we considered the same
interference threshold for both the PUs. In Fig. 6, we plot the opportunistic throughput evolution of 4
(out of 15) SUs’ links and the worst-case average violation of the interference constraints as a function of
the iteration index (counted considering both the inner and the outer iterations), achieved using Algorithm
4. As expected, Fig. 6 shows that the algorithms proposed to solve the game G(X ,θ) with side constraints
require more iterations to converge that those used to solve the game Gπ=0(X ,θ). On the other hand,
global interference constraints impose less stringent conditions on the transmit power of the SUs than
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those imposed by the individual interference constraints, implying better throughput performance of the
SUs (at the price however of more signaling among the SUs) [26].
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7 Conclusions
In this paper, we proposed a novel class of noncooperative games with (possibly) side constraints, where
each SU aims to maximize his own opportunistic throughput by choosing jointly the sensing duration, the
detection thresholds, and the vector power allocation over SISO frequency-selective interference channels,
under local and (possibly) global average probabilistic interference constraints. In particular, to enforce
global interference constraints while keeping the optimization as decentralized as possible, we proposed a
pricing mechanism that penalizes the SUs in violating the global interference constraints. The proposed
games belong to the class of nonconvex games and lack boundedness in some of the optimization variables,
which makes the analysis quite involved. A major contribution of this paper was to introduce a new
methodology for studying the existence and the uniqueness of the solution of nonconvex games with
side constraints and design distributed solution algorithms. The proposed class of algorithms spans from
noncooperative settings modeling selfish users to cooperative scenarios where the users are willing to
exchange limited signaling (in the form of consensus algorithms) in favor of better performance. Numerical
results showed the superiority of the proposed design (in terms of achievable system throughput) with
respect to the state-of-the-art centralized and decentralized resource allocation algorithms for CR systems.
Together with their fast convergence behavior, this makes them appealing in many practical CR scenarios.
Appendix
A Proof of Proposition 2
A.1 Intermediate results
To prove the proposition we need two intermediate results, stated in Lemma 11 and Lemma 12 below.
Lemma 11 proves that the Abadie Constraint Qualification (ACQ) holds true at every (nontrivial) optimal
solution of (32), which implies that any of such solutions must satisfy the KKT conditions associated
with (32). Lemma 12 proves the boundedness of the multipliers λ⋆q associated with the local nonconvex
constraint I(x⋆q) ≤ 0 at any solution x⋆q of (32).
Lemma 11. The ACQ holds at every feasible solution of problem (32).
Proof. The proof follows similar steps of [26, Prop. 8] and thus is omitted.
Lemma 12. Let x−q ∈ Y−q and πt ∈ St for some t > 0. At every solution x⋆q of (32), any optimal
multiplier λ⋆q associated with the constraint I(x
⋆
q) ≤ 0 satisfies λ ≤ λmax, with λmax defined in (42).
Proof. First of all, observe that the nonconvex problem (32) admits a solution x⋆q =
(
τ̂⋆q , p
⋆
q , P
fa⋆
q
)
, for
every given x−q ∈ Y−q and πt ∈ St; by Lemma 11, x⋆q must satisfy the KKT conditions of the problem,
for some multipliers λ⋆q associated with the constraint I(x
⋆
q) ≤ 0. Given the KKT conditions (which are
omitted here), starting from the complementarity of the pq,k-variables, summing over k, and invoking the
orthogonality condition, we obtain: denoting by χ⋆q and ξ
⋆
q,k the multipliers associated to the power budget
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and the spectral mask constraints, respectively,
(
λ⋆q + πt
) N∑
k=1
Pmissq,k (τˆ
⋆
q , P
fa⋆
q ) |GP,q(k)|2 p⋆q,k + χ⋆q
N∑
k=1
p⋆q,k +
N∑
k=1
ξ⋆q,k p
⋆
q,k
=
N∑
k=1
p⋆q,k(
N∑
k=1
rq,k(p
⋆
q,k,p−q)
) σ2q,k +∑
r 6=q
|Hqr(k)|2 pr,k + |Hqq(k)|2p⋆q,k

≤ 1 min1≤k≤N
 log
 1 + |Hqq(k)|
2pmaxq,k
σ2q (k) +
∑
r 6=q
|Hqr(k)|2 pmaxr (k)


 min1≤k≤N {σ2q,k}
, λmaxq ,
(69)
where in the last inequality we used the following property of the logarithmic function, which is an
immediate consequence of its concavity: for any scalar a > 0 and c > 0, it holds that log(1 + c y) ≥
y log(1+c a), for all y ∈ [0, a]. Inequality in (69) together with the complementarity conditions associated
to the power constraints p⋆q ≤ pmaxq and
∑N
k=1 p
⋆
q,k ≤ Pq, and the individual nonconvex interference
constraint Iq(x
⋆
q) ≤ 0 lead to
λ⋆q I
max
q + χ
⋆
q Pq +
N∑
k=1
ξ ⋆q,k p
max
q,k ≤ λmaxq . (70)
The desired result λ⋆q ≤ λmax follows from (70) and min
{
Pq, mink {pmaxq,k }
}
= mink p
max
q,k for q.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
The proof is organized in the following two steps:
Step 1. We show first that under the assumptions in the proposition, each problem (32) has a unique
optimal solution, for any given x−q ∈ Y−q.
Step 2. Then, we prove that any optimal solution of (32) is nontrivial.
Step 1. Given x−q ∈ Y−q and πt ∈ St, let x⋆q =
(
τ̂⋆q, p
⋆
q, P
fa⋆
q
)
be a solution of (32); by Lemma 11,
there exists a multiplier λ⋆q such that (x
⋆
q , λ
⋆
q) satisfies the VI(Kq,Fq) in (40); by Lemma 12, it must be
λ⋆q ≤ λmax. It turns out that to prove Proposition 2 is sufficient to show that, under the condition in the
proposition, the VI(Kq,Fq) has a unique solution in the xq-variables.
Suppose by contradiction that there are two distinct solutions of the VI(Kq,Fq), denoted by y(1)q ,
(x
(1)
q , λ
(1)
q ) ∈ Yq × [0, λmax] and y(2)q , (x(2)q , λ(2)q ) ∈ Yq × [0, λmax], with x(1)q 6= x(2)q . Then, we have(
y
(2)
q − y(1)q
)T
Fq
(
y
(1)
q ; x−q, πt
)
≥ 0(
y
(1)
q − y(2)q
)T
Fq
(
y
(2)
q ; x−q, πt
)
≥ 0.
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Summing the two inequalities yields to
0 ≤ −
(
y(1)q − y(2)q
)T (
Fq(y
(1)
q ; x−q, πt)− Fq(y(2)q ; x−q, πt)
)
. (71)
Invoking the mean-value theorem applied to to the univariate, differentiable, scalar-valued function
δ ∈ [0, 1] 7→
(
y(1)q − y(2)q
)T
Fq (yq(δ); x−q, πt) ; (72)
we deduce that there exists some 0 < δ¯ < 1, such that (71) can be written as
0 ≤ −
(
y(1)q − y(2)q
)T (
Fq(y
(1)
q ; x−q, πt)− Fq(y(2)q ; x−q, πt)
)
(73)
= −
(
y(1)q − y(2)q
)T
JyqFq
(
yq(δ¯); x−q, πt
) (
y(1)q − y(2)q
)
(74)
= −
(
x
(1)
q − x(2)q
λ
(1)
q − λ(2)q
)T [ ∇2xqLq ((xq(δ¯), x−q), πt, λq(δ¯)) , ∇xqIq (xq(δ¯))
−∇xqIq
(
xq(δ¯)
)T
0
](
x
(1)
q − x(2)q
λ
(1)
q − λ(2)q
)
(75)
= −
(
x(1)q − x(2)q
)T ∇2xqLq ((xq(δ¯), x−q), πt, λq(δ¯)) (x(1)q − x(2)q ) , (76)
where in (73) JyqFq( · ; x−q, πt) denotes the Jacobian matrix of Fq(· ;x−q, πt) with respect to yq ,
(xq, λq). Since xq(δ¯) ∈ Yq (recall that Yq is a convex set) and λq(δ¯) ≤ λmax, the inequality in (76)
contradicts the positive definiteness of ∇2xqLq
(
(xq(δ¯), x−q), πt, λq(δ¯)
)
, as assumed in Proposition 2.
Step 2. To complete the proof it is enough to show that the pq-component of any optimal solution
x⋆q =
(
τ̂⋆q , p
⋆
q , P
fa⋆
q
)
of (32) is such that
∑
k p
⋆
q(k) is lower bounded by a positive constant; see Lemma 13
below. To state the lemma, we need the following intermediate definitions. Let prefq , (p
ref
q,k) ∈ Pq be any
tuple such that ∑
k
|GP,q(k)|2 prefq,k ≤ 2 Imaxq , (77)
so that for all pairs (τ̂q, P
fa
q ) satisfying (12)(b), the interference constraints (12)(a) evaluated at (τ̂q, p
ref
q , P
fa
q )
hold; and let
P fa
ref
q , max
k
{
Q
(
σq,k|1 α̂q,k + (µq,k|1 − µq,k|0)
√
fq τmin
σq,k|0
)}
. (78)
Note that, under the feasibility conditions (25), such a P fa
ref
q satisfies [see (12)(b)]
σq,k|0
σq,k|1
Q−1
(
P fa
ref
q
)
− τ̂q
µq,k|1 − µq,k|0
σq,k|1
≤ α̂q,k, ∀k = 1, . . . , N, (79)
for any τ̂q ≥
√
fq τmin. Finally, given t > 0, let
ηrefq (t) , log
(
1− τ
min
Tq
)
+ log
(
1− P farefq
)
+ log
(∑
k
rq,k
(
prefq ,p
max
−q
))− t
2
(
max
k=1,...,N
{|GP,q(k)|2 prefq,k}) .
(80)
We can now introduce Lemma 13 that provides a lower bound for the optimal sum-power allocation of
each player.
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Lemma 13. Given t > 0, and feasible πt ∈ St, p−q ∈ P−q and τ̂r ∈
[√
fr τmin,
√
fr τmax
]
for all r 6= q,
the power-part p⋆q of any optimal solution of the q-th nonconvex optimization problem in (12) satisfies
N∑
k=1
p⋆q,k ≥
(
min
k=1,...,N
{
σ̂2q,k
})
exp
(
ηrefq (t)
)
. (81)
Proof. Let t > 0, πt ∈ St, 0 ≤ pr ≤ pmaxr with r 6= q, and τ̂r for r 6= q satisfying τ̂r ∈
[√
fr τmin,
√
fr τmax
]
be given. Let define τ̂ refq ,
√
fq
Q− 1
∑
r 6=q
τ̂r√
fr
; we then have
√
τmin ≤ τ̂
ref
q√
fq
≤ 1
Q
∑Q
r=1
τ̂ r√
fr
≤ √τmax.
Therefore, if x⋆q = (τ̂
⋆
q , p
⋆
q, P
fa⋆
q ) is player q’s best-response corresponding to πt, τ̂−q, and p−q, then
R̂q
(
τ̂ refq , (p
ref
q ,p−q), P
faref
q
)
− πt ·
∑
k
Pmissq,k (τˆ
ref
q , P
faref
q ) |GP,q(k)|2 prefq,k
≤ Rq
(
τ̂⋆q , (p
⋆
q ,p−q), P
fa⋆
q
)− πt ·∑
k
Pmissq,k (τˆ
ref
q , P
faref
q ) |GP,q(k)|2 p⋆q,k −
c
2
(1− 1
Q
)
τ̂⋆q√
fq
− 1
Q
∑
r 6=q
τ̂⋆r√
fr
2
≤ log
(∑
k
rq,k(p
⋆
q ,p−q)
)
≤ log
(∑
k
log
(
1 +
p⋆q,k
σˆ2q,k
))
≤ log
(∑
k
(
p⋆q,k
σˆ2q,k
))
,
(82)
where R̂q
(
τ̂q, p, P
fa
q
)
and rq,k (pq,p−q) are defined in (5) and (6), respectively. On the other end, we
have:
R̂q
(
τ̂ refq , (p
ref
q ,p−q), P
faref
q
)
− πt ·
∑
k
Pmissq,k (τˆ
ref
q , P
faref
q ) |GP,q(k)|2 prefq,k ≥ ηrefq (t), (83)
with ηrefq (t) defined in (80), and in (83) we used πt ∈ St and Pmissq,k ≤ 1/2. The desired bound in (81)
follows readily from (82) and (83).
B Proof of Corollary 3
The proof is based on the following two steps.
Step 1. We introduce a symmetric matrix, denoted by ∇2xqLq ∈ R(N+2)×(N+2), having the property that:
given t > 0,
yT
(
∇2xqLq (x, πt, λq)
)
y ≥ |y|T ∇2xqLq |y| ∀ (x, πt, λq) ∈ Y × St × [0, λmax], and y ∈ RN+2, (84)
which guarantees that ∇2xqLq (x, πt, λq) is positive definite if ∇2xqLq is so.
Step 2. We derive sufficient conditions for ∇2xqLq to be positive definite.
Step 1. It is not difficult to see that (84) is satisfied if ∇2xqLq is built such that: for all (x, πt, λq) ∈
Y × [0, t] × [0, λmax],
[
∇2xqLq
]
ij
=

≤
[
∇2xqLq (x, πt, λq)
]
ij
if i = j,
≤ −
∣∣∣∣[∇2xqLq (x, πt, λq)]ij
∣∣∣∣ if i 6= j.
(85)
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To construct such a matrix, we need to bound properly the entries of ∇2xqLq (x, πt, λq). Recalling that
∇2xqLq (x, πt, λq) has the following expression [cf. (41)]:
∇2xqLq (x, πt, λq) , −∇2xqθq(x) + λq · ∇2xqIq(xq) + πt · ∇2xqI(x) (86)
we focus next on each term in (86) separately.
−Matrix −∇2xqθq(x): Introducing
rq(p) ,
N∑
k=1
rq,k(p) ≤
N∑
k=1
log
(
1 +
pmaxq,k
σ̂2q,k
)
, rmaxq , (87)
with rq,k(p) defined in (6), −∇2xqθq(x) is given by
−∇2xqθq(x) =

2
fq Tq
(
1 +
τ̂2q
fq Tq
)
(
1− τ̂
2
q
fq Tq
)2 + c
(
1− 1/Q√
fq
)2
01×N 0
0N×1 ∇2pq (− log rq(p)) 0N×1
0 01×N
1(
1− P faq
)2

, (88)
with
∇2
pq
(− log rq(pq,p−q)) =
[−∇2
pq
rq(p)
rq(pq)
+
∇pqrq(p)∇pqrq(p)T
rq(pq)2
]
(89)
∇pqrq(p) = vect


1
σ̂2q,k +
Q∑
r=1
|Ĥqr(k)|2 pr(k)

N
k=1

(90)
∇2
pq
rq(p) = Diag


−1(
σ̂2q,k +
Q∑
r=1
|Ĥqr(k)|2 pr,k
)2

N
k=1

(91)
We provide now some bounds of the above quantities that will be used to define the diagonal entries
of ∇2xqLq. The minimum eigenvalue of the positive definite matrix ∇2pq (− log rq(p)) is lower bounded by:
for all p ∈ P =∏Qq=1Pq,
λmin
(
∇2
pq
(− log rq(p))
)
≥ min
k=1,...,N

dmin− log rq,k ,
1/rmaxq
σ̂2q,k +
Q∑
r=1
|Ĥqr(k)|2 pmaxr,k

, dmin− log rq , (92)
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whereas a lower bound of the first and last diagonal elements in (88) are: for all feasible
(
τ̂q, P
fa
q
)
[see
conditions (b) and (c) in (12)],
2
fq Tq
(
1 +
τ̂2q
fq Tq
)
(
1− τ̂
2
q
fq Tq
)2 ≥
2
fq Tq
(
1 +
(
τ min
)2
Tq
)
(
1−
(
τ min
)2
Tq
)2 , dminτ̂q and 1(
1− P faminq
)2 ≥ 1(
1− P faq
)2 , dminP faq ,
(93)
where we used the following lower bound of P faq : P
fa
q ≥ minkQ
((
µq,k|1 − µq,k|0
) √
fq τmax
σq,k|0
)
, P fa
min
q .
This bounds will be used to define the diagonal entries of the candidate matrix ∇2xqLq.
−Matrix ∇2xqIq(xq). Let introduce first the following quantities and their associated bounds:
ωτ̂q,k ,
∂Pmissq,k (τˆq , P
fa
q )
∂τ̂q
and
∣∣ωτ̂q,k∣∣ ≤ 1√
2 π
(
µq,k|1 − µq,k|0
σq,k|1
)
, ωmaxτ̂q,k (94)
ωP faq ,k ,
∂Pmissq,k (τˆq, P
fa
q )
∂P faq
and
∣∣∣ωP faq ,k∣∣∣ ≤ ( σq,k|0σq,k|1
)
exp
{(
µq,k|1 − µq,k|0
σq,k|0
√
fqτmax
)2
/2
}
, ωmaxP faq ,k, (95)
ωτ̂q P faq ,k ,
∂2Pmissq,k (τˆq, P
fa
q )
∂τ̂q∂P faq
and ωτ̂q P faq ,k ≤ max
{
Q−1(αq,k),
µq,k|1 − µq,k|0
σq,k|1
√
fqτmax
}
· exp
{(
µq,k|1 − µq,k|0
σq,k|0
√
fsτmax
)2
/2
}
, ωmax
τ̂q P faq ,k
(96)
ωτ̂q τ̂q,k ,
∂2Pmissq,k (τˆq, P
fa
q )
∂(τ̂q)
2
and ωP faq P faq ,k ,
∂2Pmissq,k (τˆq, P
fa
q )
∂(P
(q)
fa )
2
, (97)
which can be collected in the vectors ωτ̂q , (ωτ̂q ,k)
N
k=1, ωP faq , (ωP faq ,k)
N
k=1, ωτ̂q P faq , (ωτ̂q P faq ,k)
N
k=1,
ωP faq P faq , (ωP faq P faq ,k)
N
k=1, and ω
max
τ̂q
, (ωmaxτ̂q ,k )
N
k=1, ω
max
P faq
, (ωmax
P faq ,k
)Nk=1, ω
max
τ̂q P faq
, (ωmax
τ̂q P faq ,k
)Nk=1. Finally,
we introduce the column vector GP,q ,
(|GP,q(k)|2)Nk=1 of the cross-channel transfer function between the
secondary transmitter q and the PU, and the notation a ⊙ b , (ak · bk)Nk=1 for given a , (ak)Nk=1 and
b , (bk)
N
k=1. Then, matrix ∇2xqIq(xq) can be written as
∇2
xq
Iq(xq) = 2

1T vect
(
ωτ̂q τ̂q ⊙GP,q ⊙ pq
)
, vect
(
ωτ̂q ⊙GP,q
)T
, 1Tvect
(
ω
τ̂qP
(q)
fa
⊙GP,q ⊙ pq
)
vect
(
ωτ̂q ⊙GP,q
)
, 0N×N , vect
(
ω
P
(q)
fa
⊙GP,q
)
1Tvect
(
ω
τ̂qP
(q)
fa
⊙GP,q ⊙ pq
)
, vect
(
ω
P
(q)
fa
⊙GP,q
)T
, 1Tvect
(
ω
P
(q)
fa
P
(q)
fa
⊙GP,q ⊙ pq
)
 .
(98)
Based on (98), let us introduce the matrix
[
∇2xqIq(xq)
]
off
obtained from ∇2xqIq(xq) by setting to zero
the diagonal terms ([A]off denotes the off-diagonal part of the matrix A) and take an upper bound of its
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off-diagonal entries (the inequalities below have to be intended component-wise):
[
∇2
xq
Iq(xq)
]
off
, 2

0, vect
(
ωτ̂q ⊙GP,q
)T
, 1T vect
(
ω
τ̂qP
(q)
fa
⊙GP,q ⊙ pq
)
vect
(
ωτ̂q ⊙GP,q
)
, 0N×N , vect
(
ω
P
(q)
fa
⊙GP,q
)
1Tvect
(
ω
τ̂qP
(q)
fa
⊙GP,q ⊙ pq
)
, vect
(
ω
P
(q)
fa
⊙GP,q
)T
, 0

≤ max
k
{|GP,q(k)|2} · 2

0, vect
(
ωmaxτ̂q
)T
, 1Tvect
(
ωmax
τ̂qP faq
⊙ pmaxq
)
vect
(
ωmaxτ̂q
)
, 0N×N , vect
(
ωmax
P faq
)
1Tvect
(
ωmax
τ̂qP faq
⊙ pmaxq
)
, vect
(
ωmaxP faq
)T
, 0

︸ ︷︷ ︸
,
[
∇2
xq
Iq
]up
off
, max
k
{|GP,q(k)|2} · [∇2xqIq]up
off
.
(99)
−Matrix ∇2xqI(x). Following similar steps as for (99), we obtain[∣∣∣∇2xqI(x)∣∣∣]
off
≤ max
k
{|GP,q(k)|2} · [∇2xqIq]up
off
. (100)
We are now ready to introduce the matrix ∇2xqLq satisfying (85). Given t > 0, and the definitions in
(94)-(96) and (100), we define
∇2xqLq , Diag
{
(dminτ̂q , (d
min
− log rq ,k)
N
k=1, d
min
P faq
)
}
− 2 ·max {t, λmax} ·max
k
{|GP,q(k)|2} · [∇2xqIq]up
off
(101)
Step 2. It follows from Step 1 that ∇2xqLq in (101) satisfies the desired property (84). Condition (43) of
the corollary is readily obtained by imposing that ∇2xqLq is row-diagonal dominant, and setting
γ(1)q =
2 max(t, λmax)
min

dminτ̂q∑
j
[
[∇2xqIq]upoff
]
1j
, min
i=1,...,N
 d
min
q,i∑
j
[
[∇2xqIq]upoff
]
ij
 ,
dmin
P faq∑
j
[
[∇2xqIq]upoff
]
N+2 j

. (102)

C Proof of Theorem 5
To prove the theorem we need the following lemma whose proof follows the same idea of that in Lemma
12 and thus is omitted.
Lemma 14. Let t > λmax, with λmax defined in (42). Then, at every solution (x⋆, λ⋆, π⋆t ) of the VI(Zt,Ψ)
defined in (45) [stationary solution of Gt(X , θ)], the price constraints (30) are not binding, i.e., π⋆t < t.
Proof of Theorem 5. We prove only statement (a); the proof of the second part (b) follows similar
steps of those in the proof of Proposition 2 and thus is omitted. Given t > t⋆, under the assumptions in
(a), Proposition 4 states that the game Gt(X , θ) admits a nontrivial NE (x⋆, π⋆t ); by Lemma 11, there
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exist multipliers λ⋆ such that (x⋆,λ⋆, π⋆t ) satisfies the VI(Zt,Ψ) in (45) [or equivalently (44)]. Lemma 14
shows that the upper bound constraint on the price in St is not binding at (x⋆,λ⋆, π⋆t ), implying from
iii) of (44) that η⋆t = 0 and thus 0 ≤ π⋆t ⊥ −I(x⋆) ≥ 0. Hence, (x⋆, π⋆t ) must be a NE of the original
un-truncated game G(X , θ) [recall that, under the positive definiteness of the matrices ∇2xqLq(x, πt, λq)
on Y × St × [0, λmax], each optimization problem in (32), with x−q = x⋆−q and πt = π⋆t , has a unique
stationary (and thus optimal) solution, which then must be equal to x⋆q ; see Proposition 2]. 
D Proof of Corollary 6
In order to obtain more general conditions than those in Theorem 5, by Lemma 13, we can restrict the
check of the positive definiteness of the matrices ∇2xqLq(x, πt, λq) and A(x, λ, πt) as required in Theorem
5 to the subset of the feasible set where any solution of the game lies. More specifically, let us introduce the
restriction of the sets Pq and Yq defined in (4) and (19), respectively, to the power allocations satisfying
(81): given t > 0,
P̂tq ,
{
p ∈ Pq :
N∑
k=1
pq,k ≥
(
min
k
{
σ̂2q,k
})
exp
(
ηrefq (t)
)}
, q = 1, . . . , Q, (103)
Ŷ t ,
∏
q
Ŷtq, (104)
where Ŷtq is defined as Yq in (19), but with Pq replaced by P̂tq. By Lemma 13, instead of checking the
positive definiteness of ∇2xqLq(x, πt, λq) and A(x, λ, πt) on the feasible set Y × St × [0, λmax], we can
restrict this requirement to the subset Ŷt × St × [0, λmax].
We can now prove the corollary. We show next that (47) are sufficient conditions for the matrix
A(x, λ, πt) to be positive definite on Y × St × [0, λmax]. Fist of all, observe that matrix A(x, λ, πt) can
be written as
A(x, λ, πt) ,

∇2x1L1
∣∣
c=0
, ∇2x1x2θ1
∣∣
c=0
· · · ∇2x1xQθ1
∣∣∣
c=0
... · · · . . . ...
∇2xQx1θQ
∣∣∣
c=0
, · · · ∇2xQxQ−1θQ
∣∣∣
c=0
∇2xQLQ
∣∣∣
c=0

︸ ︷︷ ︸
,A(x,λ, πt)|c=0
(105)
+ c (1− 1/Q)
 D−1f
(
IQ − 11
T
Q
)
D−1f 0
0 0

︸ ︷︷ ︸
up to a permutation
, (106)
where Dfs , diag
{(√
fq
)Q
q=1
}
. Since the matrix in (106) is positive semidefinite, we can focus only on
A(x, λ, πt)|c=0. To obtain a sufficient condition for A(x, λ, πt)|c=0 to be positive definite on Ŷ t × St ×
[0, λmax], we follow a similar idea of that in Corollary 3. Namely, we build a proper matrix A such that,
for some t > λmax,
yT (A(x, λ, πt)|c=0) y ≥ |y|T A |y| ∀(x, πt, λ) ∈ Ŷ t × St × [0, λmax], and y ∈ RQ (N+2). (107)
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To this end, we focus on each term in (105) separately and derive proper bounds.
−Matrix
∣∣∣∇2xqxrθq∣∣∣c=0∣∣∣. Recalling the definition of rq(p) ,∑k rq,k(p), with rq,k(p) given in (6), we have
∇2xqxrθq
∣∣∣
c=0
=
 0 01×N 00N×1 ∇2pqpr (− log rq(p)) 0N×1
0 01×N 0
 , (108)
with
∇2pqpr (− log rq(p)) =
[
−∇2pqprrq(p)
rq(pq)
+
∇pqrq(p)∇prrq(p)T
rq(pq)2
]
, (109)
∇pqrq(p) given in (89) and
∇prrq(p) = vect


−|Ĥqr(k)|2 pq,k(
σ̂2q,k +
Q∑
r=1
|Ĥqr(k)|2 pr,k
)σ̂2q,k +∑
r 6=q
|Ĥqr(k)|2 pr,k


N
k=1

, (110)
∇2pqprrq(p) = Diag


−|Ĥqr(k)|2(
σ̂2q,k +
Q∑
r=1
|Ĥqr(k)|2 pr,k
)2

N
k=1

. (111)
Using the following lower bound for the rate function rq(p): given t > 0 and pq ∈ P̂ tq,
rq(p) ≥
(
N∑
k=1
pq,k
)
· min
k=1,...,N
log
1 + p
max
q,k
σ̂2q,k +
∑
r 6=q
|Ĥqr(k)|2 pmaxr,k

︸ ︷︷ ︸
,rminq
(112)
≥
(
min
k=1,...,N
{
σ̂2q,k
}) · exp (ηrefq (t)) · rminq , rlowq (t), (113)
where the second inequality follows from Lemma 13, we have for
∣∣∣∇2pqpr (− log rq(p))∣∣∣: given t > 0, pq ∈ P̂tq
and pr ∈ [0, pmaxr ] with r 6= q,
∣∣∣∇2pqpr (− log rq(p))∣∣∣ ≤ 1rq(p) Diag

 |Ĥqr(k)|2(
σ̂2q,k
)2

N
k=1
+
1
rq(p)2
vect

(
1
σ̂2q,k
)N
k=1
 · vect

 |Ĥqr(k)|2 pq,k(
σ̂2q,k
)2

N
k=1

T
≤ 1
rlowq (t)
Diag

 |Ĥqr(k)|2(
σ̂2q,k
)2

N
k=1
+
1
rminq
vect

(
1
σ̂2q,k
)N
k=1
 ·vect

 |Ĥqr(k)|2(
σ̂2q,k
)2

N
k=1

T
,
[
∇2
pqpr
θq
]up
,
(114)
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which leads also to∥∥∥∇2pqpr (− log rq(p))∥∥∥ ≤ maxk=1,...,N
{
|Ĥqr(k)|2
σ̂4q,k
}
·
(
1
rlowq (t)
+
1
rlowq (t)
· 1
rminq
· max
k=1,...,N
{
1
σ̂4q,k
})
︸ ︷︷ ︸
,ξsupq (t)
. (115)
Using ∇2xqLq defined in (101), we are now ready to introduce the matrix A, defines as: given t > 0,
A ,
(
Aqr
)Q
q,r=1
with Aqr ,
{ ∇2xqLq, if q = r,
−Diag
{[
0,
[
∇2pqprθq
]up
, 0
]}
, otherwise,
(116)
which satisfies the desired property in (107).
A sufficient condition for (107) can be obtained as in (47), by imposing that (the symmetric part of)
A is row diagonal dominant. More specifically, introducing
ζ(t) , max
q=1,...,Q
 maxk=1,...,N
{
1
σ̂2q,k
}
·
 1
rlowq (t)
+
1
rlowq (t)
· 1
rminq
·
N∑
k′=1
1
σ̂2
q,k′
 (117)
the diagonal dominance conditions is: for each q = 1, . . . , Q and i = 1, . . . , N ,
1
2
∑
r 6=q
N∑
j=1
[[
∇2pqprθq
]up
+
([
∇2pqprθq
]up)T]
ij
≤ ζ(t)
2
∑
r 6=q
(
max
k=1,...,N
{
|Ĥqr(k)|2
σ̂2q,k
}
+ max
k=1,...,N
{
|Ĥrq(k)|2
σ̂2r,k
})
.
(118)
After substituting the explicit expression of
[
∇2pqprθq
]up
and doing some manipulations, (118) leads to
the desired condition (47), where we defined γ
(2)
q as
γ(2)q , ζ
max
q (t) · γ(1)q (119)
with γ
(1)
q given in (102) and
ζmaxq (t) ,
ζ(t)
2 t
· 1
min
{∑
j
[
[∇2xqIq]upoff
]
1j
, min
i=1,...,N
{∑
j
[
[∇2xqIq]upoff
]
ij
}
,
∑
j
[
[∇2xqIq]upoff
]
N+2 j
} , (120)
where [∇2xqIq]upoff and ζ(t) are defined in (99) and (117), respectively.
E Convergence of Asynchronous Best-Response Algorithms for Gπ(X , θ)
In this section, we study the convergence of asynchronous best-response algorithms solving the game
Gπ(X ,θ) in (48); an instance of such algorithms is represented by Algorithm 1. Since the study of
convergence is based on contraction arguments of the best-response map associated with game Gπ(X ,θ),
we derive first sufficient conditions for this best-response to be a contraction; see Sec. E.1. We then
provide the main theorem stating convergence of the asynchronous best-response algorithms; see Sec. E.2.
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E.1 Contraction properties of the best-response of Gπ(X , θ)
Before introducing the main result of this section, we need the following intermediate definitions. Given
Lq defined in (37), let Bq (x, λq, πt) be the 2× 2 matrix, defined as
Bq (x, λq, πt) ,
 ∇2τ̂qLq (x, πt, λq)
∣∣∣
c=0
, −
∥∥∥∇2τ̂q (pq ,P faq )Lq (x, πt, λq)∥∥∥
−
∥∥∥∇2(pq ,P faq ) τ̂qLq (x, πt, λq)∥∥∥ , λleast (∇2(pq ,P faq )Lq (x, πt, λq))
 , (121)
where ‖A‖ , ρ (ATA)1/2 and λleast(B) denote the spectral norm of A and the minimum eigenvalue of
the symmetric matrix B, respectively. Given t > 0 and Ŷt as defined in (103) (cf. Appendix D), we also
introduce
ρq(t) ,

ρq(t) , min
(xq, λq) ∈ Ŷtq × [0, λmax]
(x−q, πt) ∈ Y−q × St
{λleast (Bq (x, λq, πt))} , if ρq(t) ≥ 0,
0, otherwise;
(122)
and the diagonal matrices Dq(t, c) and Eqr (x)
Dq(t, c)
2 ,
 ρq(t) + c
(
1− 1/Q√
fq
)2
, 0
0 ρq(t)
 and Eqr (x) ,
 ∣∣∣∇2τ̂q τ̂rθq (x)∣∣∣ , 0
0,
∥∥∥∇2pqprθq (x)∥∥∥
 ,
(123)
with θq(·) defined in (17). Given the coefficients
βqr(t, c) , max
(xq,x−q)∈Ŷtq×Y−q
∥∥Dq(t, c)−1 Eqr (x) Dr(t, c)−1∥∥ , (124)
for r, q = 1, . . . , Q and r 6= q, we can finally define the Q×Q matrix Γ(t) that plays a key role in studying
contraction properties of the best-response map associated with the game Gπ(X ,θ):
[Γ(t)]q,r ,
{
1, if r = q,
−βqr(t, c), otherwise.
(125)
It is important to remark here that the off-diagonal entries of the matrix Γ(t) depend, among other
quantities, on the cross-channels
{
|Ĥqr(k)|2
}
and
{|GP,q(k)|2}. Roughly speaking, this dependence is
such that the βqr(t, c)’s tend to decrease as the aforementioned cross-channels decrease, meaning that the
βqr(t, c) remains “small” as long as the overall MUI in the system remains “small”. We will show shortly
that this is what one needs to guarantee the convergence of the distributed best-response based algorithms
introduced in Sec. 5.1. More formally, by postulating that Γ(t) is a P-matrix, Theorem 15 below states
the contraction properties of the best-response mapping of the game Gπ(X , θ) with respect to the suitably
defined block maximum norm [see proof of the theorem for details].
Theorem 15. Given the game Gπ(X , θ) with exogenous (fixed) price π ≥ 0, suppose that Γ(t) in (125)
is a P-matrix. Then the following hold:
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(a) Each nonconvex optimization problem in (48) has a unique (nontrivial) optimal solution Bq(x−q) ,(
τ̂⋆q (x−q), p
⋆
q(x−q), P
fa⋆
q (x−q)
)
, for every given x−q ∈ Y−q and π ≥ 0;
(b) The best-response map Y ∋ x → B(x) , (Bq(x−q))Qq=1 is a block-contraction; the unique fixed-point
of B is the unique x-component of the NE of the game.
Proof. To prove contraction of the best-response, we need to specify first under which norm the best-
response map contracts. We will use the following norms: the block-maximum norm on RQ(N+2), defined
as [42]
‖y‖wblock , max
i=1,...,Q
‖yi‖i
wi
, for y = (yi)
Q
i=1 ∈ RQ(N+2), (126)
where ‖·‖i is a valid vector norm on RN+2 and w , [w1, . . . , wQ]T > 0 is any given positive weight
vector. In particular, we choose ‖·‖i as follows: partitioning the vector yi ∈ RN+2 as yi = (yi,1,yi,2:N+2),
with yi,2:N+2 (or yi,1) being the (N + 1)-length vector containing the last N + 1 components (or the
first component) of yi, and given the matrix Di(t, c) as defined in (123), let the vector norm ‖·‖i be
‖y‖i ,
∥∥(|yi,1|, ‖yi,2:N+2‖2)∥∥Di(t, c)2 , where ‖x‖Di(t, c)2 , ‖Di(t, c)x‖2. As it will be clarified shortly, the
choice of such a norm is instrumental to obtain convergence conditions that can be satisfied for all ranges
of c ≥ 0. We also need to introduce the (weighted) maximum norm on RQ, defined as [49]
‖x‖w∞,vec , maxi=1,...,Q
|xi|
wi
, for x ∈ RQ; (127)
and the matrix norm ‖·‖w∞,mat on RQ×Q induced by ‖·‖w∞,vec , given by [49]
‖A‖w∞,mat , maxi
1
wi
Q∑
j=1
|[A]ij |wj , for A ∈ RQ×Q. (128)
We are now ready to prove the theorem.
(a): Given t ≥ 0, the P property of matrix Γ(t) implies ρq(t) > 0 for all q, and thus ∇2xqLq(x, π, λq) ≻ 0
for all (xq, λq) ∈ Ŷtq × [0, λmax], x−q ∈ Y−q, and π ≥ 0. According to Proposition 2, this guarantees the
uniqueness of the optimal solution Bq(x−q) =
(
τ̂⋆q (x−q), p
⋆
q(x−q), P
fa⋆
q (x−q)
)
of each nonconvex problem
in (48), for every given π ≥ 0 and x−q ∈ Y−q.
(b): Given the unique solution Bq(x−q), by Lemma 11, it follows that there exists a multiplier λq associated
with the nonconvex constraint Iq(xq) ≤ 0 such that the tuple (Bq(x−q), λq) satisfies the KKT optimality
conditions of the optimization problem in (48), or equivalently, the VI(Kq,Fq) defined in (40), which we
rewrite here for the reader’s convenience:[
yq − Bq(x−q)
λq − λq
]T ( ∇xqLq ((Bq(x−q), λq), x−q, π)
−Iq
(Bq(x−q))
)
≥ 0, ∀ (yq, λq) ∈ Yq × RM+ , (129)
with ∇xqLq defined in (37). Recall that λq ∈ [0, λmax] (Lemma 12) and Bq(x−q) ∈ Ŷtq (Lemma 13).
Consider now two feasible points x(1) , (x
(1)
q )
Q
q=1, x
(2) , (x
(2)
q )
Q
q=1 ∈ Y, with x(i)q ,
(
τ̂
(i)
q , p
(i)
q , P
fa(i)
q
)
for i = 1, 2, and q = 1, . . . , Q, and let λ
(i)
q ’s be the multipliers associated with the nonconvex constraints
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{Iq(xq) ≤ 0}’s at the optimal solutions Bq(x(i)−q) =
(
τ̂⋆q (x
(i)
−q), p
⋆
q(x
(i)
−q), P
fa⋆
q (x
(i)
−q)
)
, for i = 1, 2. Eval-
uating (129) first in the solution (Bq(x(1)−q), λ
(1)
q ) given (yq, λq) = (Bq(x(2)−q), λ
(2)
q ), then in the solution
(Bq(x(2)−q), λ(2)q ) given (yq, λq) = (Bq(x(1)−q), λ(1)q ), and summing the resulting inequalities, we obtain
0 ≥
[
Bq(x(1)−q)− Bq(x(2)−q)
λ
(1)
q − λ(2)q
]T  ∇xqLq ((Bq(x(1)−q), λ(1)q ), x(1)−q , π)−∇xqLq ((Bq(x(2)−q), λ(2)q ), x(2)−q, π)
−Iq
(
Bq(x(1)−q)
)
−
(
−Iq
(
Bq(x(2)−q)
))  .
(130)
By the main-value theorem we deduce that there exists a δ ∈ (0, 1) and a pair (xq(δ),x−q(δ), λq(δ)) ,
δ ·
(
Bq(x(1)−q),x(1)−q , λ(1)q
)
+ (1− δ) ·
(
Bq(x(2)−q),x(2)−q , λ(2)q
)
such that
0 ≥
(
Bq(x(1)−q)− Bq(x(2)−q)
)T (∇2xqLq ((xq(δ), λq(δ)), x−q(δ), π))(Bq(x(1)−q)− Bq(x(2)−q))
+
(
Bq(x(1)−q)− Bq(x(2)−q)
)T ∑
r 6=q
∇2xqxrθq (xq(δ), x−q(δ))
(
x(1)r − x(2)r
)
. (131)
Using the definition of Bq(x, πt, λq), ρq(t), ξ
sup
q , and Dq(t, c) and Erq (x) as given in (121), (122), (123),
and (115), respectively, let us introduce for each q = 1, . . . , Q, the error vectors:
eBq ,

∣∣∣τ̂⋆q (x(2)−q)− τ̂⋆q (x(1)−q)∣∣∣∥∥∥∥∥ p⋆q(x
(2)
−q)− p⋆q(x(1)−q)
P fa⋆q (x
(2)
−q)− P fa⋆q (x(1)−q)
∥∥∥∥∥
 , and eq ,

∣∣∣τ̂ (2)q − τ̂ (1)q ∣∣∣∥∥∥∥∥ p
(2)
q − p(1)q
P
fa(2)
q − P fa(1)q
∥∥∥∥∥
 (132)
and the matrices
Cq (x(δ), λq(δ), π) ,
 ∇2τ̂qLq ((xq(δ), λq(δ)), x−q(δ), π) , − ∥∥∥∇2τ̂q (pq,P faq )Lq ((xq(δ), λq(δ)), x−q(δ), π)∥∥∥
−
∥∥∥∇2(pq,P faq ) τ̂qLq ((xq(δ), λq(δ)), x−q(δ), π)∥∥∥ , λmin (∇2(pq,P faq )Lq ((xq(δ), λq(δ)), x−q(δ), π))

= Bq (x(δ), λq(δ), π) +
 c
(
1− 1/Q√
fq
)2
, 0
0 0
  Dq(t, c)2 (133)
and
Eqr (x(δ)) =
 ∣∣∣∇2τ̂q τ̂rθq (x(δ))∣∣∣ , 0
0,
∥∥∥∇2pqprθq (x(δ))∥∥∥
 =
 c
(
1− 1/Q√
fq
)(
1/Q√
fr
)
, 0
0,
∥∥∥∇2pqpr (− log rq(p(δ)))∥∥∥

≤

c
(
1− 1/Q√
fq
)(
1/Q√
fr
)
, 0
0, max
k=1,...,N
{
|Ĥqr(k)|2
σ̂4q,k
}
· ξsupq
 , Esupqr , (134)
where the upper bound in (134) follows from Lemma 13 and (115). Then, from inequality (131), we deduce
eT
Bq
Cq (x(δ), λq(δ), π) eBq ≤ eTBq
∑
r 6=q
Eqr (x(δ)) er, (135)
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which, using the bounds in (133) and (134) and the definition of βqr(t, c) in (124), leads∥∥∥Dq(t, c) eBq∥∥∥2 ≤∑
r 6=q
∥∥Dq(t, c)−1 Eqr (x(δ)) Dr(t, c)−1∥∥ ‖Dr(t, c) er‖2 ≤∑
r 6=q
βqr(t, c) ‖Dr(t, c) er‖2 ,
(136)
for all q = 1, . . . , Q (the inequality in (131) is trivially satisfied if
∥∥∥Dq(t, c) eBq∥∥∥2 = 0). Introducing the
vectors eB,D ,
(∥∥∥eBq∥∥∥Dq(t, c)
)Q
q=1
and eD ,
(
‖eq‖Dq(t, c)
)Q
q=1
, and the matrix E(t) , I−Γ(t), the set of
inequalities in (136) can be written in vectorial form as
eB,D ≤ E(t) eD, ∀x(1),x(2)∈ Y, (137)
and thus, for any given w > 0, we have∥∥∥B(x(1))− B(x(2))∥∥∥w
block
=
∥∥∥eB,D∥∥∥w∞,vec ≤ ‖E(t)‖w∞,mat ‖eD‖w∞,vec = ‖E(t)‖w∞,mat ∥∥∥x(1) − x(2)∥∥∥wblock ,
(138)
for all x(1),x(2)∈ Y . To complete the proof we need to show that ‖E(t)‖w∞,mat < 1 for some w > 0.
Invoking Lemma [34, Lemma 5.2.14] and [42, Cor. 6.1], we obtain the desired result:
Γ(t) is a P-matrix ⇔ ∃ w¯ > 0 such that cB , ‖E(t)‖w¯∞,mat < 1. (139)
E.2 Asynchronous convergence theorem
Convergence of best-response algorithms solving the game Gπ(X , θ) follows readily from the block-contraction
properties of the best-response, as proved in Theorem 15 and is thus guaranteed under the same conditions
given in Theorem 15.
Theorem 16. Given the game Gπ(X , θ) with exogenous (fixed) π ≥ 0, suppose that Γ(t) in (125) is a
P-matrix. Then, any sequence generated by the asynchronous algorithm based on the best-response B and
starting from any point in Y converges to a NE of the game, for any given updating feasible schedule of
the players.
E.3 On the contraction/convergence conditions
We derive here easier conditions to be checked implying those in Theorem 16 (and Theorem 15); this sheds
light also on their physical interpretation. The approach is similar to that followed to prove Corollary 6;
we thus provide only a sketch of the proof.
The main idea is to build a matrix, say Γlow(t), such that Γ(t) ≥ Γlow(t) [the inequality has to be
intended component-wise], implying that if Γlow(t) is a P matrix, then Γ(t) is so [34], which is the condition
required by Theorem 16. Then, we provide sufficient conditions for Γlow(t) to be a P matrix.
To obtain such a Γlow(t), it is sufficient to properly upper bound (the modulus of) the off-diagonal
entries βqr(t, c) of Γ(t). Given the expression of βqr(t, c) [cf. (124)], a way to do that is to find a matrix
Blowq such that Bq (x, λq, πt) ≥ Blowq , and a diagonal matrix Dlowq (t, c) such that Dq(t, c) ≥ Dlowq (t, c),
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whereBq (x, λq, πt) andDq(t, c) are defined in (121) and (123), respectively. Skipping tedious intermediate
derivations, we obtain the following
Blowq ,
 dminτ̂q −ςupq (t)
−ςupq (t) λleast
([
∇2xqLq
]
2:N+2
)  , (140)
where dminτ̂q is defined in (93),
[
∇2xqLq
]
2:N+2
denotes the (N + 1)-dimensional lower right block of the
matrix ∇2xqLq defined in (101), and ςupq (t) is given by
ςupq (t) , 2 max {t, λmax} · max
k=1,...,N
{ |GP,q(k)|2
I max
}
·
∥∥∥∥∥∥
vect
(
ωmaxτ̂q
)
1Tvect
(
ωmax
τ̂qP faq
⊙ pmaxq
) ∥∥∥∥∥∥ , (141)
with ωmaxτ̂q and ω
max
τ̂qP faq
defined in (94) and (96), respectively. Note that, since the following bounds hold
between the entries of Bq (x, λq, πt) and B
low
q :
∇2τ̂2qLq (x, p̂it, λq)
∣∣∣
c=0
≥ dminτ̂q ,∥∥∥∇2τ̂q (xq,P faq )Lq (x,λq, πt)∥∥∥ ≤ ςupq (t),
λleast
(
∇2(xq ,P faq )Lq (x, p̂it, λq)
)
≥ λleast
([
∇2xqLq
]
2:N+2
)
,
matrix Blowq satisfies the desired property Bq (x, λq, πt) ≥ Blowq .
Finally, using Blowq , we can introduce a lower bound of the quantities ρq(t) in (122)
ρlowq (t) ,
{
ρlowq (t) , λleast
(
Blowq
)
, if ρlowq (t) ≥ 0,
0, otherwise,
(142)
and define the matrix Dlowq (t, c) as
Dlowq (t, c)
2 ,
 ρlowq (t) + c
(
1− 1/Q√
fq
)2
, 0
0 ρlowq (t)
 , (143)
which satisfies Dq(t, c) ≥ Dlowq (t, c). Using the above matrices, the desired upper bound βupqr (t, c) of the
coefficients βqr(t, c) is
βupqr (t, c) ,
∥∥Dlowq (t, c)−1Esupqr Dlowr (t, c)−1∥∥
= max

c · 1/(Q − 1)√
ρlowq (t) fq
(1− 1/Q)2 + c
√
ρlowr (t) fr
(1− 1/Q)2 + c
, max
k=1,...,N
{
|Ĥqr(k)|2
σ̂4q,k
}
ξsupq√
ρlowq (t)
√
ρlowr (t)

≥ βqr(t, c),
(144)
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with ξsupq and E
sup
qr defined in (115) and (134), respectively. Using these quantities it is not difficult to see
that the matrix Γlow(t) defined as
[
Γlow(t)
]
q,r
,
{
1, if r = q,
−βupqr (t, c), otherwise,
(145)
satisfies the desired property Γ(t) ≥ Γlow(t) for any t ≥ 0.
Since Γlow(t) is a P matrix if and only if ρ
(
I− Γlow(t)) < 1 [34, Lemma 5.2.14], imposing that
I − Γlow(t) is row or column diagonal dominat, leads to the desired sufficient conditions guaranteeing
convergence of asynchronous algorithms based on the best-response B. This is made formal in the corollary
below.
Corollary 17. Statements in Theorem 16 (or Theorem 15) hold true if one of the two following conditions
is satisfied:
- Low received MUI: for all q = 1, . . . , Q, ∑
r 6=q
βupqr (t, c) < 1, (146)
- Low transmitted MUI: for all r = 1, . . . , Q,∑
q 6=r
βupqr (t, c) < 1. (147)
The physical interpretation of the above conditions is similar to that given for the existence/uniqueness
of the NE (cf. Section 4.3). Roughly speaking, conditions (146) or (147) require “low” interference in
the network, meaning “small” values of the (normalized) cross-channels |Ĥqr(k)|2/σ̂4q,k as well as large
values of coefficients ρlowq (t), which is met if, among all, the (normalized) cross-channels |GP,q(k)|2/I max
are “sufficiently small”. An illustrative example is obtained in the two opposite cases where there is no
optimization of the sensing times (and thus c = 0) or the sensing times are optimized by imposing a
common optimal sensing time by choosing a (sufficiently) large constant c (and there are many active
SUs). For those two cases, conditions (146) and (147) reduce respectively to
∑
r 6=q
max
k=1,...,N
{
|Ĥqr(k)|2
σ̂4q,k
}
γqr < 1, and
∑
q 6=r
max
k=1,...,N
{
|Ĥqr(k)|2
σ̂4q,k
}
γqr < 1, (148)
with
γqr ,
ξsupq√
ρlowq (t)
√
ρlowr (t)
.
Note that γqr’s, among all, depend on the cross-channels |GP,q(k)|2/I max, and become “small” when
|GP,q(k)|2/I max are small. Conditions (148) are thus satisfies if there is not “too much” interference in the
system.
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F Convergence of Best-Response Algorithms for G(X , θ)
F.1 Proof of Theorem 10
First of all note that, given λ0 ≥ 0 and π0t ≥ 0 and under the setting of Lemma 7, the game Gt(X ,θ,λ0, π0t )
has a unique NE, denoted by
(
x⋆(λ0, π0t ),λ
⋆(λ0, π0t ), π
⋆
t (λ
0, π0t )
)
, where we made explicit the dependence
on the regularization tuple (λ0, π0t ). This makes the sequence {(x⋆(λn, πnt ),λ⋆(λn, πnt ), π⋆t (λn, πnt ))}∞n=0
generated by Algorithm 3 well defined. The uniqueness of the NE of Gt(X ,θ,λ0, π0t ) can be proved by
exploring the connection between the game and a suitably defined VI, as briefly outlined next. Under the
positive definiteness of matrix A (x,λ,πt) (as required by Lemma 7), Gt(X ,θ,λ0, π0t ) is equivalent to the
VI(Zt, Ψλ0,π0t ), with Zt given in (45) and the VI function Ψλ0,π0t (x,λ, πt) defined as
Ψ
λ
0,π0t
(x,λ, πt) = Ψ(x,λ, πt) + ǫ ·
 0Q(N+2)×1(( λ
πt
)
−
(
λ0
π0t
))  . (149)
In other words, the VI(Zt, Ψλ0,π0t ) is obtained by the VI(Zt, Ψ) in (45) introducing the proximal regu-
larization of some of the VI variables, namely the λ-variables and πt-variable. The Jacobian matrix of
Ψ
λ
0,π0t
(x,λ, πt) denoted by JΨλ0,π0t
(x,λ, πt) is
JΨ
λ
0,π0t
(x,λ, πt) ,
 A (x,λ,πt) ∇xI(x) ∇xI(x)−∇xI(x)T ǫ · I 0
−∇xI(x)T 0 ǫ
 , (150)
where ∇xI(x) , ∇x[I1(x1), · · · , IQ(xQ)]. IfA (x,λ,πt) is uniformly positive definite, then so is JΨλ0,π0t (x,
λ, πt). It turns out that, under the setting of Lemma 7, the regularized VI(Zt, Ψλ0,π0t ) is strongly monotone
[35, Prop. 2.3.2(c)] and thus has a unique solution [35, Th. 2.3.3], implying the uniqueness of the NE(
x⋆(λ0, π0t ),λ
⋆(λ0, π0t ), π
⋆
t (λ
0, π0t )
)
of Gt(X ,θ,λ0, π0t ).
Once we have proved that (x⋆(λ, πt),λ
⋆(λ, πt), π
⋆
t (λ, πt)) is well defined for any given λ ≥ 0 and
πt ≥ 0, we can derive the main properties of such a tuple [interpreting its components as functions of
(λ, πt)], along with its connection with the NE of the game Gt(X , θ) [and thus G(X , θ)]; these properties
will be instrumental to prove Theorem 10.
Proposition 18. Given t > 0, suppose that A (x,λ, πt) in (46) is uniformly positive definite for all
(x,λ, πt) ∈ Y × [0, λmax]Q × St, and let ǫ > 0 be given. Then the following hold:
(a) The mapping associated with the λ-components and π-component of (x⋆(λ, πt),λ
⋆(λ, πt), π
⋆
t (λ, πt)),
i.e., (
λ⋆(·)
π⋆t (·)
)
: [0, λmax]Q × St ∋ (λ, πt) 7→
(
λ⋆(λ,πt)
π⋆t (λ,πt)
)
(151)
has a fixed point, and it is nonexpansive on [0, λmax]Q × St;
(b) The mapping associated with the x-components of (x⋆(λ, πt),λ
⋆(λ, πt), π
⋆
t (λ, πt)), i.e.,
x⋆(·) : [0, λmax]Q × St ∋ (λ, πt) 7→ x⋆(λ,πt) (152)
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is Lipschitz continuous on [0, λmax]Q × St, i.e., there exists a constant 0 < ν < +∞ such that
‖x⋆(λ(1), π(1)t )− x⋆(λ(2), π(2)t )‖2 ≤ ν ‖(λ(1), π(1)t )− (λ(2), π(2)t )‖2, (153)
for all (λ(1), π
(1)
t ), (λ
(2), π
(2)
t ) ∈ [0, λmax]Q × St;
(c) For any fixed-point (λ, πt) ∈ [0, λmax]Q × St of (λ⋆(·), π⋆t (·)), the tuple (x⋆(λ, πt), λ, πt) is a solution
of the VI(Zt, Ψ); therefore, it is a NE of Gt(X , θ).
Proof. We prove next only (a) and (b); (c) follows similarly.
(a) Let
(
x,λ, πt
) ∈ Zt be a solution of the VI(Zt, Ψ) in (45), whose existence is guaranteed by Lemma 7;
recall that, by Lemma 12, it must be
(
x,λ, πt
) ∈ Y×[0, λmax]Q×St. It follows that: i) (x⋆(λ, πt), λ⋆(λ, πt),
π⋆t (λ, πt)) is the unique solution of the VI(Zt, Ψλ,πt); and ii)
(
x,λ, πt
)
is also a solution of VI(Zt, Ψλ,πt).
Hence, it must be x⋆(λ, πt) = x, λ
⋆(λ, πt) = λ, and π
⋆
t (λ, πt) =πt, which implies the existence of a
fixed-point of the mapping (λ⋆(·), π⋆t (·)) in (151); moreover, since
(
x,λ, πt
) ∈ Y × [0, λmax]Q × St, such a
fixed point is in [0, λmax]Q × St.
We prove now that (λ⋆(·), π⋆t (·)) is nonexpansive on [0, λmax]Q × St. Given two distinct tuples
(λ(1), π
(1)
t ), (λ
(2), π
(2)
t ) ∈ [0, λmax]Q×St, by definition, the tuples (x⋆(λ(i), π(i)t ),λ⋆(λ(i), π(i)t ), π⋆t (λ(i), π(i)t )),
with i = 1, 2, satisfy the following:
 x− x
⋆(λ(i), π
(i)
t )
λ− λ⋆(λ(i), π(i)t )
πt − π⋆t (λ(i), π(i)t )

T

(
∇xqLq
(
x⋆(λ(i), π
(i)
t ), λ
⋆
q(λ
(i), π
(i)
t ), π
⋆
t (λ
(i), π
(i)
t ),
))Q
q=1
−

(
Iq
(
x⋆q(λ
(i), π
(i)
t )
))Q
q=1
I
(
x⋆(λ(i), π
(i)
t )
)
+ ǫ ·( λ⋆(λ(i), π(i)t )− λ(i)
π⋆t (λ
(i), π
(i)
t )− π(i)t
)
 ≥ 0, (154)
for all (x, λ, πt) ∈ Yt × [0, λmax]Q ×St and i = 1, 2. Thus, similar to the proof of Theorem 15, we deduce
 x
⋆(λ(2), π
(2)
t )− x⋆(λ(1), π(1)t )
λ⋆(λ(2), π
(2)
t )− λ⋆(λ(1), π(1)t )
π⋆t (λ
(2), π
(2)
t )− π⋆t (λ(1), π(1)t )

T
×


(
∇xqLq
(
x⋆(λ(1), π
(1)
t ), λ
⋆
q(λ
(1), π
(1)
t ), π
⋆
t (λ
(1), π
(1)
t )
))Q
q=1
(
Iq
(
x⋆q(λ
(2), π
(2)
t )
))Q
q=1
I
(
x⋆(λ(2), π
(2)
t )
)
+ ǫ( λ⋆(λ(1), π(1)t )− λ(1)
π⋆t (λ
(1), π
(1)
t )− π(1)t
)
+
−

(
∇xqLq
(
x⋆(λ(2), π
(2)
t ), λ
⋆
q(λ
(2), π
(2)
t ), π
⋆
t (λ
(2), π
(2)
t )
))Q
q=1
(
Iq
(
x⋆q(λ
(1), π
(1)
t )
))Q
q=1
I
(
x⋆(λ(1), π
(1)
t )
)
− ǫ( λ⋆(λ(2), π(2)t )− λ(2)
π⋆t (λ
(2), π
(2)
t )− π(2)t
)

 ≥ 0.
(155)
By the mean-value theorem, it follows that there exists a tuple (xδ, λδ, πδ) lying on the line segment joining
(x⋆(λ(1), π
(1)
t ),λ
⋆(λ(1), π
(1)
t ), π
⋆
t (λ
(1), π
(1)
t )) and (x
⋆(λ(2), π
(2)
t ),λ
⋆(λ(2), π
(2)
t ), π
⋆
t (λ
(2), π
(2)
t )) such that [see
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also (150)](
x⋆(λ(2), π
(2)
t )− x⋆(λ(1), π(1)t )
)T
A (xδ, λδ, πδ)
(
x⋆(λ(2), π
(2)
t )− x⋆(λ(1), π(1)t )
)
≤ ǫ ·
(
λ⋆(λ(2), π
(2)
t )− λ⋆(λ(1), π(1)t )
π⋆t (λ
(2), π
(2)
t )− π⋆t (λ(1), π(1)t )
)T (
λ(2) − λ(1)
π
(2)
t − π(1)t
)
− ǫ ·
∥∥∥∥∥
(
λ⋆(λ(2), π
(2)
t )− λ⋆(λ(1), π(1)t )
π⋆t (λ
(2), π
(2)
t )− π⋆t (λ(1), π(1)t )
)∥∥∥∥∥
2
2
.
(156)
Applying the Cauchy–Schwartz inequality and reorganizing terms we obtain:∥∥∥∥∥
(
λ⋆(λ(2), π
(2)
t )− λ⋆(λ(1), π(1)t )
π⋆t (λ
(2), π
(2)
t )− π⋆t (λ(1), π(1)t )
)∥∥∥∥∥
2
2
≤
∥∥∥∥∥
(
λ⋆(λ(2), π
(2)
t )− λ⋆(λ(1), π(1)t )
π⋆t (λ
(2), π
(2)
t )− π⋆t (λ(1), π(1)t )
)∥∥∥∥∥
2
·
∥∥∥∥∥
(
λ(2) − λ(1)
π
(2)
t − π(1)t
)∥∥∥∥∥
2
−1
ǫ
(
x⋆(λ(2), π
(2)
t )− x⋆(λ(1), π(1)t )
)T
A (xδ, λδ, πδ)
(
x⋆(λ(2), π
(2)
t )− x⋆(λ(1), π(1)t )
)
≤
∥∥∥∥∥
(
λ⋆(λ(2), π
(2)
t )− λ⋆(λ(1), π(1)t )
π⋆t (λ
(2), π
(2)
t )− π⋆t (λ(1), π(1)t )
)∥∥∥∥∥
2
·
∥∥∥∥∥
(
λ(2) − λ(1)
π
(2)
t − π(1)t
)∥∥∥∥∥
2
where the last inequality follows from the positivity of the quadratic form, due to the positive definiteness
of A (xδ, λδ, πδ); which proves the desired nonexpansive property of the mapping (λ
⋆(·), π⋆t (·)):∥∥∥∥∥
(
λ⋆(λ(2), π
(2)
t )− λ⋆(λ(1), π(1)t )
π⋆t (λ
(2), π
(2)
t )− π⋆t (λ(1), π(1)t )
)∥∥∥∥∥
2
≤
∥∥∥∥∥
(
λ(2) − λ(1)
π
(2)
t − π(1)t
)∥∥∥∥∥
2
. (157)
(b) Following similar steps as in (a) and using the Cartesian structure of the set Zt we deduce that, for any
given (λ(1), π
(1)
t ), (λ
(2), π
(2)
t ) ∈ [0, λmax]Q×St, there exists a tuple (xη, λη, πη) lying on the segment joining
(x⋆(λ(1), π
(1)
t ),λ
⋆(λ(1), π
(1)
t ), π
⋆
t (λ
(1), π
(1)
t )) and (x
⋆(λ(2), π
(2)
t ),λ
⋆(λ(2), π
(2)
t ), π
⋆
t (λ
(2), π
(2)
t )) such that(
x⋆(λ(2), π
(2)
t )− x⋆(λ(1), π(1)t )
)T
A (xη, λη, πη)
(
x⋆(λ(2), π
(2)
t )− x⋆(λ(1), π(1)t )
)
≤
(
x⋆(λ(2), π
(2)
t )− x⋆(λ(1), π(1)t )
)T
[∇xI(xη),∇xI(xη)]
(
λ⋆(λ(1), π
(1)
t )− λ⋆(λ(2), π(2)t )
π⋆t (λ
(1), π
(1)
t )− π⋆t (λ(2), π(2)t )
)
≤
∥∥∥x⋆(λ(2), π(2)t )− x⋆(λ(1), π(1)t )∥∥∥
2
· ‖[∇xI(xη),∇xI(xη)]‖ ·
∥∥∥∥∥
(
λ(2) − λ(1)
π
(2)
t − π(1)t
)∥∥∥∥∥
2
,
(158)
where the last inequality follows from the Cauchy–Schwartz inequality and the nonexpansive property of
(λ⋆(·), π⋆t (·)) [cf. (157)], and ∇xI(x) , ∇x[I1(x1), · · · , IQ(xQ)]. Invoking the uniform positive definiteness
of A (xη, λη, πη) and the boundedness of the set Y, we deduce from (158)∥∥∥x⋆(λ(2), π(2)t )− x⋆(λ(1), π(1)t )∥∥∥ ≤ ‖[∇xI(xη),∇xI(xη)]‖λleast (A (xη, λη, πη))
∥∥∥∥∥
(
λ(2) − λ(1)
π
(2)
t − π(1)t
)∥∥∥∥∥ ≤ ν ·
∥∥∥∥∥
(
λ(2) − λ(1)
π
(2)
t − π(1)t
)∥∥∥∥∥
(159)
for some finite positive ν, which proves the desired Lipschitz continuity of x⋆(·) on [0, λmax]Q × St.
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Proof of Theorem 10. We are now ready to prove the theorem. The outer loop of Algorithm 10 [see
(62) in Step 3] is an instance of the Jacobi Over Relaxation, JOR, method [50] applied to the mapping
(λ⋆(·), π⋆t (·)); which, using the notation introducing above, can be equivalently rewritten as:(
λ(n+1)
π
(n+1)
t
)
= (1− ǫ) ·
(
λ(n)
π
(n)
t
)
+ ǫ ·
(
λ⋆(λ(n), π
(n)
t )
π⋆t (λ
(n), π
(n)
t )
)
. (160)
Since (λ⋆(·), π⋆t (·)) is nonexpansive on [0, λmax]Q × St [Proposition 18(a)], the sequence {(λ(n), π(n)t )}∞n=1
generated by the JOR scheme (160) converges to a fixed-point
(
λ, πt
)
of (λ⋆(·), π⋆t (·)) [50, Th. 12.3.7].
By Proposition 18(b) [see (153)], the convergence of {(λ(n), π(n)t )}∞n=1 implies also the convergence of the se-
quence {x⋆(λ(n), π(n)t )}∞n=1 in the inner loop of Algorithm 10 to x⋆
(
λ, πt
)
; the limit point
(
x⋆
(
λ, πt
)
, λ, πt
)
is the claimed NE of Gt(X , θ) [Proposition 18(c)], and thus G(X , θ), if t > λmax (Theorem 5). 
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